Management of water resources
History of water resources management
In 1855, the Chilean Civil Code began granting licenses to private parties for the exclusive use of water. Almost a hundred years later, Chile passed the Water Code of 1951, creating a system of water rights administration very similar to that implemented in the western United States, under which the government granted provisional water rights that would become protected property rights after use. In 1967, a new water code was enacted to replace the 1951 code, which was part of the agrarian reform. The Water Code of 1967 was intended to empower landowners to receive water and attempted to redistribute water as a component of the governments' strategy to reform agrarian policy.[11] The Water Code of 1967 strengthened government control over water and permitted the redistribution of large states and the expropriation of land and water rights that were to be reallocated, without granting any compensation to the owners. previous holders. The land expropriated before 1974 was divided into small agricultural holdings and land and water rights were granted to the current occupants, including some 48,000 small farmers.[12] Partly because of these reforms, partly because of an unfavorable economic situation, in 1973 there was a military coup that deposed President Allende. The military regime of dictator Augusto Pinochet began to adopt free market economic policies and, in 1980, a new constitution was approved.[11] We did not have to wait long for the arrival of the 1981 Water Code.
Water resources management model in Chile and the 1981 Water Code
Backed by the Chilean Constitution of 1980, the Water Code of 1981 established the framework that must be followed to allocate and manage water resources in Chile. Known internationally as the "Chilean model," the Chilean experience in water resource management is characterized by its use of free market forces and water markets to reallocate water to high-value uses. Although private water rights existed in Chile before 1981, previous water codes restricted the creation and operation of an efficient water market. While drafting the Water Code between the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government became concerned about irrigation and agricultural problems. The framers of the 1981 Water Code attempted to be efficient in reallocating water within the agricultural and irrigation markets. As stated by Hernán Buchi, former Minister of Finance of Chile (1985–1989), “the objective of government action in this field was to create solid water use rights to facilitate the correct functioning of the market as an allocation mechanism.”[13].
In his book on Chilean water law, "The Siren Song", Carl. J. Bauer offers a balanced critique of the Chilean model with its positive aspects and areas where the model has not worked as well. Among some of the problems are: environmental protection, river basin management, public interest, social equity, coordination of multiple uses and conflict resolution over water.
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- solid and broadly defined private economic rights.
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- very limited regulatory authority and.
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- a powerful but erratic judiciary, without experience in public policy matters and with a narrow and formalistic vision of law."[1].
Supported by economists at the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank and opposed by advocates of command and control, the Chilean model has been studied and documented extensively for its innovative yet controversial methods. The 1981 Water Code marked the beginning for Chile of a regulatory environment based on the management of water resources based on the free market and away from the command and control methods that failed before 1981 to effectively allocate water resources and obtain economic gains.[14] Bauer proposed that, together with the 1980 Constitution, the 1981 Water Code has successfully achieved many of its priorities. initials, especially those that strengthen private property rights. According to Bauer, the initial priorities of the Chilean model include, among others, the following: ".
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- security of private property rights to encourage private investment in the use of water and water infrastructure, which would allow new mining operations in northern Chile and the planting of high-value fruits and vegetables for export.
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- Very limited government regulation regarding the use and management of water.
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- Freedom to trade water rights to allow the reallocation of water resources from a low-value use to a high-value use where transaction costs are low and water is scarce.
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- Autonomy of the government of the private associations of channel users. This has encouraged organizations to improve their administrative and technical capacity. These associations operate mainly in the agricultural sector.
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- Creation of rights over water not intended for consumption to promote the development of hydroelectric energy".[2].
As summarized below, the distribution of powers and division of responsibilities are the hallmark of the 1981 Water Code:.
• - The executive branch of the government is responsible for planning, regulating and promoting the proper use of all water.
• - Private parties have greater potential to invest in domestic and agricultural uses of water, as well as in the maintenance of the water supply system, and play an important role in managing water supply and sanitation.
• - In the Ministry of Public Works, the General Directorate of Water carries out all measurements and investigations and is authorized to grant water use rights.
• - The Water Registry under the General Directorate of Water records all rights and transactions related to water.
Source: Article 122 of the Water Code of 1981.
Reform of the Water Code of 2005
In 2005, the 1981 Water Code reform was approved to address issues of social equity and environmental protection. For example, although more efficiency was achieved and investments increased, the unlimited allocation of water rights began to cause problems such as the monopoly of rights to surplus water or speculation and to avoid competition in various markets. The details of the reform involved fifteen years of meetings, negotiations, disputes and concessions. Over the course of the political struggle to reform the Water Code, the government's position on water markets became more favorable and it proposed reforms in response to strong political opposition from conservative parties and private sector commercial interests.[2].
The most important aspects of the 2005 reform include:.
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- Granting authority to the president to exclude water resources from economic competition in cases where it is necessary to protect public interests.
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- Obligation on the part of the General Directorate of Water (DGA) to take into account environmental aspects in the process of establishing new rights over water, especially when identifying environmentally friendly water flows and protecting the sustainable management of aquifers.
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- Collection of a license fee for unused water rights and limiting applications for water use rights to original needs, as an impediment to hoarding and speculation.[15].
Important dates during the fifteen years that the water code reform process lasted:.
• - 1992. The government introduces the first reform project.
• - 1996. The government makes amendments and introduces the second reform project.
• - 1997. The water reform is approved in the Chamber of Deputies.
• - 1999. The reform is approved in the Senate committees.
• - 2000. The reform is approved (in general) in the Senate.
• - 2004. The reform is approved (in particular) in the Senate committees.
• - 2005. The final project is approved unanimously in both chambers to address social equity and environmental sustainability problems.
Source: Peña, Humberto. Ministry of Public Works: Chile.
Water markets
The new water rights are granted by the General Directorate of Water (DGA). When competition arises for the requested water rights, these are granted through bidding to the best bidder.[13] An example of the average annual volumes of water traded between 1993 and 1998 recorded in the Maipo and Mapocho regions is the transfer of 821 L/s and 161 L/s respectively.[16].
Water trading is not common practice in most of Chile and people have no expectations of being able to solve their water allocation problems through water market transfers. This is due to a problematic distribution between markets, cultural norms that associate land rights with water rights, urbanization of irrigated area and high transaction costs in many areas, including the costs of titling unregistered rights, information costs, infrastructure modification costs and the opportunity cost of the time invested in the transaction.[13]
Although not widespread throughout Chile, water markets have been well documented in the areas where they have been implemented. Studies show an active trade in water use rights in the Limarí Valley, where water is scarce and has high economic value, especially for the emerging agricultural sector. Through trade between sectors, water has been transferred to the growing urban areas of Elqui
The Mapocho valley and upper basin, where water companies and real estate developers continually purchase water and account for 76% of water rights traded between 1993 and 1999. In contrast, water markets and trade have been more limited in the Biobío, Aconcagua and Cachapoal valleys.[13].
According to current information from the IDB and the World Bank, water markets in Chile have been successful.[1] In some regions of Chile, water markets have been successful in meeting the initial objectives of reallocating water to high-value uses and achieving economic efficiency through trade. Humberto Peña, former director of the General Directorate of Water (DGA) of Chile, offers a contrary opinion, asserting that the scarcity of trade implies that water markets do not effectively redistribute water.[13].
In water pricing, it is necessary to distinguish between two elements: the price of untreated water at the source and the price of treated water supplied to the end user. In most countries, the use of water at the source is free and the price of water allows us to recover part or all of the costs of treatment and supply. However, Chile is an exception, as the 1981 Water Code has not only confirmed private property rights over water resources, but has also allowed their sale, thus creating a water market and allowing the pricing of water resources. Supply and demand were to determine the water that was allocated and its price at the source. Price increases ranging from 41% to 240% between 1986 and 2000 are only an indicator that market forces are involved in identifying activities that have a high value and those that do not.[17].