After six years of war, much of Europe was devastated and millions of people had been killed or maimed. Fighting had occurred virtually everywhere, covering a much larger area than had been affected during the First World War. Due to the aerial bombing, most of the cities were heavily damaged, especially the industrial areas that had been the main targets of the bombing. Berlin and Warsaw were mountains of rubble, and London and Rotterdam had been badly damaged. The economic structure of the continent had come to nothing and millions of people were destitute. Even though the Dutch famine of 1944 could be resolved, the general devastation of agriculture caused a wave of hunger throughout Europe, aggravated by the harsh winter of 1946-1947 in the northeast of the continent. Infrastructure such as railways, bridges and roads, which had been the main target of aerial bombing, was also destroyed, and many cargo ships had been sunk. The smaller municipalities had not suffered as much from the destruction of the war, but the lack of transportation networks had left them practically isolated both physically and economically.
After the First World War, the European economy had also been greatly damaged, and the deep economic recession lasted well into the 1920s, with the instability and general decline in prices that this led to the global economy. The United States, despite a resurgence of isolationism, had sought to help European growth, especially through the collaboration of large American banks. When Germany was unable to pay war reparations, the Americans also contributed by expanding the loans that Germany had requested, a debt that the Americans had not yet been repaid when they entered World War II in 1941.
The State Department, under Harry Truman, was determined to pursue an active foreign policy, but Congress seemed not so interested. Initially, it was thought that little would be needed to rebuild Europe and that the United Kingdom and France, with the help of their colonies, would quickly emerge from the crisis. Despite everything, in 1947 there was still no evident progress, and a series of harsh winters had aggravated an already desperate situation in itself. European economies were not growing, and high unemployment rates and food shortages caused strikes and revolts in many populations. Two years after the end of the war, economies had not yet reached prewar levels nor did it seem possible. Agricultural production was 83% of what it had been in 1938, industrial production reached 88% and exports only 59%.[14].
Food shortage was one of the most serious problems. Before the war, Western Europe depended on imports from Eastern Europe, but these trade routes were now interrupted by the Iron Curtain. The situation became especially worrying in Germany, since in 1946 and 1947 the average daily consumption was only 800 calories per person, an insufficient amount to maintain good health in the long term. William Clayton reported to Washington that "millions of people are slowly dying of hunger." In German homes, without heating of any kind, hundreds of people died of cold. The situation in the UK was not as dire, but domestic demand forced the industry to do without coal (and therefore stop production).
Germany received many offers from Western European nations to trade food in exchange for coal and steel. Neither the Italians nor the Dutch could any longer sell the crops they had previously destined for the German market, which caused the Dutch to have to destroy a considerable proportion of their cereal crops. Denmark offered 150 tons of butter per month, Türkiye offered hazelnuts, Norway fish and fish oil, and Switzerland offered considerable amounts of fat. The Allies, however, did not wish to let Germany trade freely.[17]
In view of the growing concern of General Lucius D. Clay and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff about the advance of communism in Germany, as well as the inability of the rest of the European economy to recover without the German industrial base on which it had previously been dependent, in the summer of 1947 George Marshall, citing "national security bases" was finally able to convince President Harry Truman to rescind the punitive occupation directive JCS 1067 and replace it with the JCS 1779.[18] JCS 1067 ordered the American occupation forces to "...not carry out any measures for the economic rehabilitation of Germany", and was replaced by JCS 1779 which, in its place, stated that "An orderly and prosperous Europe requires the economic contribution of a stable and productive Germany".[19].
JCS 1067 had been in force for two years and, following its repeal, the restrictions imposed on production in heavy industry were partially lifted, allowing steel production at levels above 25% of pre-war capacity[20][21] up to a new limit of 50% of pre-war capacity.[19].
On the other hand, the dismantling of German industry continued, which led Konrad Adenauer to write to the Allies in 1949 requesting an end to this process. To this end, he argued the inherent contradiction between promoting economic growth and the elimination of factories, as well as the unpopularity of the policy. be reduced to 50% of its 1938 level, for which the destruction of 1,500 factories listed in the plan itself was necessary.[24].
In January 1946, the Allied Control Council (the governing body of the military occupation) had established a maximum limit on steel production permitted in Germany, which was set at around 5,800,000 tons of steel per year, equivalent to 25% of the pre-war production level. had to give in to pressure from the United States, France and the Soviet Union (which sought to reduce it to 3 million tons). Surplus steel plants had to be dismantled. In addition, Germany had to reduce its standard of living to the levels of the Great Depression (1932),[21] enduring reductions in its industry such as, for example, a drop in automobile production to 10% of pre-war levels.[25].
The first industrial plan for Germany was followed by several new plans, the last of them from 1949. By 1950, after the completion of these plans, 706 factories in West Germany had been de-equipped, and steel production capacity had been reduced to 6,700,000 tons per year. which cost the United States billions of dollars."[27].
In 1951, West Germany agreed to join the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) starting the following year. This meant the lifting of some of the restrictions imposed on both maximum production capacity and ongoing production, and moving them from depending on the International Authority imposed after the war to the authority of the CECA as the new regulator of the sector.[28].
On the other hand, the only great power that had not seen its infrastructure damaged was the United States. This was because they entered the war much later than most Europeans and the important fact that they did not suffer the effects of the war on their own territory. American gold reserves were still intact, as was the agricultural and industrial base. The war years were the period of greatest economic growth in the entire history of the United States, and its war material factories supplied both the nation and the allies. After the war, industries were converted and began to produce consumer goods and the austerity that characterized the war period gave way to an explosive increase in consumer spending. The long-term health of the economy depended, however, on international trade because surplus production would need markets to be exported. The Marshall Plan would be used largely, then, to acquire raw materials and manufactured goods from the United States.
Another of the great reasons why the United States was interested in starting the Plan was the beginning of the Cold War. By this time, many American government workers were becoming suspicious of Soviet activities. George Kennan, for example, one of the main designers of the Plan, already foresaw the emergence of a bipolar division of the world. For him, the Marshall Plan was the central core of a new doctrine of containment towards the Soviet Union.[29] In any case, it must be taken into account that when the Marshall Plan was introduced, the war alliances were still intact and that the Cold War had not really begun yet.
On the other hand, what did concern Americans was the influence of some communist parties with local social roots and bases. In both France and Italy, post-war poverty fueled these parties, which had already played crucial roles in the resistance during the war. These parties had a lot of popular support in the post-war elections, especially in France, where they received the most votes and, although many current historians think that the possibility of France or Italy "falling" under communist regimes was very remote,[30] the thinking heads of American politics at the time did see it as a real threat. The rise of the containment policy argued that the United States should give strong support to non-communist countries to prevent them from falling under Moscow's influence. In addition, they hoped that some Eastern European nations would also join and be "taken out" of the Soviet bloc.
Even so, even before the Marshall Plan, the United States had already begun to send aid for European recovery. During the period 1945-47, it is estimated that some 9 billion dollars came to the Old Continent indirectly, both through agreements derived from the Lend-Lease Program and through the construction of infrastructure by American soldiers. Bilateral agreements were also signed, the most important of which were with Greece and Türkiye, which occurred within the framework of the Truman Doctrine so that they would have sufficient military equipment. The then young United Nations also launched a series of humanitarian and aid missions, financed almost entirely with American money. All of these efforts were effective, but they lacked planning and coordination, and they failed to cover the most urgent needs of Europeans.[31].