Overview
Contenido
La ontología está estrechamente asociada con la cuestión de Aristóteles sobre el "ser en cuanto ser": la cuestión de qué tienen en común todas las entidades en el sentido más amplio.[4][5] El principio eleático es una respuesta a esta cuestión: afirma que el ser está inseparablemente ligado a la causalidad, que "el poder es la marca del Ser".[4] Un problema con esta respuesta es que excluye los objetos abstractos. Otra respuesta explícita pero poco aceptada se puede encontrar en el eslogan de Berkeley de que "ser es ser percibido".[6] Íntimamente relacionado pero no idéntico a la cuestión del "ser enquanto ser" es el problema de las categorías.[4] Las categorías generalmente se consideran los tipos o géneros más altos.[7] Un sistema de categorías proporciona una clasificación de entidades que es exclusiva y exhaustiva: cada entidad pertenece exactamente a una categoría. Se han propuesto varias clasificaciones de este tipo, a menudo incluyen categorías de sustancias "Sustancia (filosofía)"), propiedades "Propiedad (lógica)"), relaciones, estados de cosas") y eventos "Acontecimiento (filosofía)").[4][8] En el núcleo de la diferenciación entre categorías se encuentran diversos conceptos y distinciones ontológicas fundamentales, por ejemplo, los conceptos de particularidad y universalidad, de abstracción y concreción, de dependencia ontológica, de identidad y de modalidad.[4][8] Estos conceptos a veces se tratan como categorías en sí mismos, se utilizan para explicar la diferencia entre categorías o desempeñan otros papeles centrales para caracterizar diferentes teorías ontológicas. Dentro de la ontología, hay una falta de consenso general sobre cómo deben definirse las diferentes categorías.[7] Diferentes ontólogos a menudo no están de acuerdo sobre si una categoría determinada tiene miembros o si cierta categoría es fundamental.[8].
Particular and universal
Particulars or individuals are generally contrasted with universals "Universal (philosophy)."[9][10] Universals refer to characteristics that can be exemplified by several different particulars.[11] For example, a tomato and a strawberry are two particulars that exemplify the universal of the color red. Universals can be present in several different places in space at the same time, while particulars are restricted to one place at a given time. Furthermore, universals can be completely present at different times, which is why they are sometimes called repeatable in contrast to non-repeatable particulars.[8] The so-called problem of universals is the problem of explaining how different things can coincide in their characteristics, for example, how a tomato and a strawberry can both be red.[4][11] Realists about universals believe that there are universals. They can solve the problem of universals by explaining the common through a universal shared by both entities.[8] Realists are divided among themselves on whether universals can exist independently of being instantiated by something ("ante res") or not ("in rebus").[12] Nominalists, on the other hand, deny that there are universals. They have to resort to other notions to explain how a characteristic can be common to several entities, for example, by postulating fundamental similarity relations between entities (resemblance nominalism) or a shared membership in a common natural class (class nominalism).[8]
abstract and concrete
Many philosophers agree that there is an exclusive and exhaustive distinction between concrete objects and abstract objects.[8] Some philosophers consider this to be the most general division of being.[13] Examples of concrete objects include plants, humans, and planets, while things like numbers, sets, and propositions are abstract objects.[14] But despite general agreement about paradigmatic cases, there is less consensus as to what the characteristic marks of concreteness are. and abstraction. Popular suggestions include defining the distinction in terms of the difference between (1) existence within or outside of space-time, (2) having causes and effects or not, and (3) having contingent or necessary existence.[15][16].
Ontological dependence
An entity ontologically depends on another entity if the first entity cannot exist without the second entity. Ontologically independent entities, on the other hand, can exist on their own.[17] For example, the surface of an apple cannot exist without the apple and is therefore ontologically dependent on it.[18] Entities often characterized as ontologically dependent include properties, which depend on their bearers, and boundaries, which depend on the entity they demarcate from its environment.[19] As these examples suggest, ontological dependence") must be distinguished from causal dependence, in which that an effect depends for its existence on a cause. It is often important to draw a distinction between two types of ontological dependence: rigid and generic.[19][8] Rigid dependence refers to dependence on a specific entity, like the surface of an apple depends on its specific apple.[20] Generic dependence, on the other hand, implies a weaker form of dependence: dependence on a certain type of entity. For example, electricity depends generically on there being charged particles, but does not depend on any charged particles. specific.[19] Dependency relations are relevant to ontology, since it is often argued that ontologically dependent entities have a less robust way of being. In this way a hierarchy is introduced into the world that brings with it the distinction between more and less fundamental entities.[19].
Identity
Identity "Identity (philosophy)") is a basic ontological concept that is often expressed with the word "same".[8][21] It is important to distinguish between qualitative identity#Exact_similarity_and_identity "Similarity (philosophy)") and numerical identity. For example, consider two children with identical bicycles participating in a race while their mother is watching. The two children have the same bicycle in one sense (qualitative identity) and the same mother in another sense (numerical identity).[8] It is often said that two qualitatively identical things are indiscernible. The two senses of identity are linked by two principles: the principle of indiscernibility of identicals and the principle of identity of indiscernibles. The principle of indiscernibility of identicals is undisputed and states that if two entities are numerically identical to each other, then they exactly resemble each other.[21] The principle of identity of indiscernibles, on the other hand, is further disputed by making the converse claim that if two entities exactly resemble each other, then they must be numerically identical.[21] This implies that "no two distinct things exactly resemble each other."[22] A A well-known counterexample comes from Max Black, who describes a symmetrical universe consisting of only two spheres with the same characteristics.[23] Black maintains that the two spheres are indiscernible but not identical, thus constituting a violation of the principle of identity of indiscernibles.[24].
The problem of identity over time refers to the question of persistence: whether, or in what sense, two objects at different times can be numerically identical. This is often called diachronic identity, in contrast to synchronous identity.[21][25] The statement that "the table in the next room is identical to the one you bought last year" asserts diachronic identity between the table now and the table then.[25] A famous example of the denial of diachronic identity comes from Heraclitus, who maintains that it is impossible to enter the same river twice because of the changes that occurred in the middle.[21][26] The traditional position on the problem of persistence is endurantism, the thesis that diachronic identity in a strict sense is possible. One problem with this position is that it appears to violate the principle of indiscernibility of identicals: the object may have undergone changes in the meantime, resulting in it being discernible from itself.[8] Perdurantism or four-dimensionalism is an alternative approach that holds that diachronic identity is only possible in a loose sense: although the two objects differ from each other in a strict sense, they are both temporal parts that belong to the same whole temporally. extended.[8][27] avoids many philosophical problems that plague , but seems to be more in touch with the way we normally conceive of .[25][26].
Mode
Modality refers to the concepts of possibility, reality and necessity. In contemporary discourse, these concepts are often defined in terms of possible worlds.[8] A possible world is a complete way of how things could have been.[28] The real world is one possible world among others: things could have been different from what they really are. A proposition is possibly true if there is at least one possible world in which it is true; is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds.[29] Actualists and possibilists disagree on the ontological status of possible worlds.[8] Actualists maintain that reality is at its core real and that possible worlds must be understood in terms of real entities, for example, as fictions or as sets of sentences.[30] Possibilists, on the other hand, assign possible worlds the same fundamental ontological status than to the real world. This is a form of modal realism, which maintains that reality has irreducibly modal characteristics.[30] Another important issue in this field concerns the distinction between contingent beings and necessary beings.[8] Contingent beings are beings whose existence is possible but not necessary. Necessary beings, on the other hand, could not have failed to exist.[31][32] It has been suggested that this distinction is the highest division of being.[8][33].
Substances
The category of substances has played a central role in many ontological theories throughout the history of philosophy.[34][35] "Substance" is a technical term within philosophy that should not be confused with the more common use in the sense of chemical substances such as gold or sulfur. Various definitions have been given, but among the most common characteristics attributed to substances in the philosophical sense is that they are particulars that are ontologically independent: they are capable of existing on their own.[34][4] By being ontologically independent, substances can play the role of fundamental entities in the ontological hierarchy.[19][35] If "ontological independence" is defined as including independence causal, then only self-caused entities, like Spinoza's God, can be substances. With a specifically ontological definition of "independence", many everyday objects, such as books or cats, can be considered substances.[4][34] Another defining characteristic often attributed to substances is their ability to undergo change. Changes imply something that exists before, during and after the change. They can be described in terms of a persistent substance that gains or loses properties, or a matter changing its form.[34] From this perspective, the ripening of a tomato can be described as a change in which the tomato loses its green color and gains its red color. It is sometimes held that a substance can have a property in two ways: essentially and accidentally. A substance can survive a change in accidental properties, but it cannot lose its essential properties, which constitute its nature.[35][36].
Properties and relationships
The category of properties consists of entities that can be instantiated by other entities, for example, by substances.[37] Properties characterize their bearers, they express what their bearer is like.[4] For example, the color red and the round shape of an apple are properties of this apple. Various ways have been suggested of conceiving properties themselves and their relationship to substances.[8] The traditionally dominant view is that properties are universals found in their bearers.[4] As universals, they can be shared by different substances. Nominalists, on the other hand, deny the existence of universals.[11] Some nominalists try to explain properties in terms of relations of similarity or class membership.[8] Another alternative for nominalists is to conceptualize properties as simple particulars, so-called tropes.[4] This position implies that both the apple and its red color are particulars. Different apples may still look exactly like each other with respect to their color but do not share the same particular property from this point of view: the two color tropes are numerically distinct.[11] Another important question for any property theory is how to conceive of the relationship between a carrier and its properties.[8] Substrate theorists hold that there is some kind of substance, substrate, or bare particular (bare particular) that acts as a carrier.[38] Bundle theory is an alternative view that completely dispenses with a substrate: objects are considered simply a bundle of properties. They are held together not by a substrate but by the so-called compression relation responsible for bundling. Both substrate theory and bundle theory can be combined with the conceptualization of properties as universals or particulars.
An important distinction between properties is between categorical properties and dispositional properties.[4][40] Categorical properties refer to how something is, for example, what qualities it has. Dispositional properties, on the other hand, involve what powers something has, what it is capable of doing, even if it is not actually doing it.[4] For example, the shape of a sugar cube is a categorical property, while its tendency to dissolve in water is a dispositional property. For many properties there is a lack of consensus on how they should be classified, for example, whether colors are categorical or dispositional properties.[41][42] Categoricalism") is the thesis that at a fundamental level there are only categorical properties, that dispositional properties are nonexistent or dependent on categorical properties. Dispositionalism") is the opposite theory, giving ontological primacy to dispositional properties.[41][40] Among these two extremes, there are dualists who allow both categorical and dispositional properties in their ontology.[37].
are ways in which things, , are linked to each other.[4][43] Relations are in many ways similar to properties in that both characterize the things to which they apply. Properties are sometimes treated as a special case of relations involving only a relatum.[37] Central to ontology is the distinction between and relations.[44] A relation is internal if it is completely determined by the characteristics of its relata.[45] For example, an apple and a tomato stand in the internal relation of similarity to each other because they are both red.[46] Some philosophers have inferred from this that internal relations have no status. own ontological, since they can be reduced to intrinsic properties.[44][47] , on the other hand, are not fixed by the characteristics of their relata. For example, a book is in an with a table by being on top of it. But this is not determined by the characteristics of the book or the table such as its color, its shape, etc.[44].
States of affairs and events
States of affairs") are complex entities, unlike substances and properties, which are generally conceived as simple.[4][48] Complex entities are constructed from or constituted by other entities. Atomic states of affairs are constituted by a particular and a property instantiated by this particular.[8][49] For example, the state of affairs that Socrates is wise is constituted by the particular "Socrates" and the property "wise." Relational states of affairs imply several particulars and a relation that connects them. States of affairs that are given are known as facts (philosophy)). [4][50][51] It is often held that states of affairs play the role of truth-makers"): judgments or statements are true because the corresponding state of affairs is given effect.[49][52].
"Event (philosophy)" events occur in time, sometimes thought to involve a change in the way property is acquired or lost, such as the grass becoming dry.[53] But from a liberal point of view, the retention of a property without any change can also be considered an event, for example, the grass staying wet.[53][54] Some philosophers view events as universals that can repeat themselves at different times, but the more dominant view is that events Events are particular and therefore not repeatable.[54] Some events are complex in the sense that they are composed of a sequence of events, often called a process.[55] But even simple events can be conceived as complex entities involving an object, a time, and the property exemplified by the object at that moment.[56][57] The so-called process philosophy or process ontology attributes ontological primacy to changes and processes as opposed to emphasis. in static being in the traditionally dominant metaphysics of substances.[58][59].