Heritage theory
La mayoría de los autores trazan el origen de la teoría del patrimonio a la obra de Aubry y Rau de 1873.[8] Ellos definen patrimonio como “el conjunto de relaciones jurídicas valorables en dinero, que son los activos o pasivos de una misma persona, y que se considera una universalidad jurídica” (“l’ensemble des rapports de droit appréciables en argent, qui ont pour sujet actif ou passif une même personne et qui sont envisagé comme formant une universalité juridique”).
Lo anterior implica varias cosas:[9] Cada persona tiene un patrimonio (es, por decirlo así, una característica o atributo universal de las personas) y ese patrimonio es individual, único, indivisible. Sigue que el patrimonio como tal es diferente a lo que lo constituye (el patrimonio es como una bolsa, cuyo contenido son derechos de propiedad, etc.). Sigue también que no todos los derechos o bienes de una persona son patrimoniales (solo aquellos capaces de ser evaluados monetariamente). Finalmente, la mayoría de las autoridades que adoptan esta posición entienden los derechos desde el punto de vista subjetivo. (ver Derecho subjetivo). Consecuentemente muchos autores se refieren a esta percepción como la concepción subjetiva del patrimonio (a diferencia del patrimonio objetivo).
La teoría del patrimonio considera que el patrimonio es independiente de los bienes que una persona posea. Inclusive, una persona puede no tener ningún bien, y aun así, tiene un patrimonio. Es, en otras palabras, una aptitud para poseer, de tal forma que el patrimonio de una persona también incluye derechos de propiedad futuros.
Los bienes de la persona forman un todo unitario que responde por las obligaciones que esta haya contraído, es decir, cuando una persona se obliga, obliga a la masa de bienes. El mejor ejemplo del resultado práctico de esta definición de patrimonio es el caso de los acreedores quirografarios").[10] Desde este punto de vista se considera que el acreedor quirografario tiene un derecho personal sobre el patrimonio del deudor, pero no sobre los bienes. El deudor puede enajenar todos sus bienes y sustituirlos por otros totalmente distintos, y el acreedor no puede hacer nada para evitarlo, pero cualquiera que sean esos bienes, el acreedor continúa manteniendo su derecho. Así, el acreedor quirografario tiene un derecho personal sobre el patrimonio del deudor, pero no puede disponer sobre sus bienes (salvo un acto simulado con la intención por parte del deudor de perjudicarle).
Link to legal personality
Heritage is a consequence of personality. The elements of both assets and liabilities are subject to the provisions of a single will: those of the owner. Three principles emerge from this premise:
• - Only people can have assets: this applies to both natural and legal persons.
• - Every person has an estate: with the separation of assets from the estate, the conclusion is reached that every person has an estate, the contents of which vary. Heritage is nothing more than an purchasing power that every person has.
• - The relationship between person and property does not consist of a right. The person is owner of his or her assets, but does not have disposal rights over it. A person cannot, for example, transfer his or her right to acquire property in the past.
Derived characters
• - Transmission mortis causa: when the subject dies, the personality holding the estate is extinguished. That is, the heritage is separated from the person, being transmitted to the heirs, and they act as an extension of their personality. Thus, the succession does not deal with the assets and obligations of the deceased, but rather with his or her assets in general.
• - Transmission inter vivos: the transfer of assets inter vivos is prohibited, because as stated above, assets are a characteristic of personality.
Since the personality is indivisible and the patrimony is an emanation of it, a person can only have one patrimony.
Under the same previous criteria, the assets cannot be seized. It would be absurd to consider seizing a person's potential to acquire future pecuniary appreciation rights and obligations.
Criticism of heritage theory
Some authors accept the definition of assets as "a set of assets of a person." That is, they define heritage as the grouping of assets and not as a character of the personality of every individual. They further allege that the distinction between assets and heritage is not useful in practice.[11].
Among these criticisms, one of the most interesting is the one derived from the work of Henri Capitant")[12] and Léon Duguit,[13] which can be summarized as follows: if we accept that associations or companies have assets, we have to accept that this assets are different or different from that of the individuals that make up that association or company (in the sense that none of those individuals as such can freely dispose of that social assets and that obligations on it do not fall or bind all of the rights. property of the partners. Conversely, the debts or obligations of individuals do not fall on the assets of the company): that assets belong to the company as a moral or legal individual. But that existence is only a fiction and fictions cannot own anything.[14] In reality, that assets belong to the individuals who form that society. "affected"[15] to different purposes, societies or companies.[16].
The logical development of this idea naturally leads to the complete denial of the legal fiction of the "legal person" and its replacement with the simpler conception that it is not the case - strictly - that the goods or rights of such a legal person "belong to everyone and belong to no one" but rather belong to the end to which they are dedicated (the purpose of the association).[17] For example, it is not the case that a "legal person" has the right to freely dispose of goods or rights that have been assigned to it assigned, but that assets are dedicated to a specific purpose: those assets or rights are dedicated (affected) to that purpose. In other words, it can be argued that what has a right to legal protection is that particular end or purpose. Alois von Brinz") specifically substitutes the thesis of the legal entity and replaces it with a perception of heritage called in French "patrimoine d'affectation"; generally translated into Spanish as patrimony of affection or, sometimes, as "fiduciary patrimony"[18] or also "patrimonio fin"[19] or even as patrimony objective.[20] In contrast to these theories, Brinz ("theory of the patrimony fin") understands that the rights of legal entities, strictly speaking, do not belong “to anyone” but rather belong only with a final purpose.