Plans for the tower's renovation were published in 2012.[6]​ Overseen by Studio E Architects,[7]​ The renovation cost £8.7 million,[8]​ carried out by Rydon Ltd, of Forest Row, East Sussex in conjunction with Artelia for contract administration and Max Fordham as specialist mechanical and electrical consultants. Completed in 2016. As part of the project, in 2015-2016, the concrete structure received new windows and new aluminum composite cladding, in part to improve the appearance of the building.

Two types were used: Arconic's Reynobond, which consists of two coil-coated aluminum sheets that are fusion bonded to both sides of a polyethylene core; and Reynolux. Below these, and fixed to the outside of the flat walls, was Celotex RS5000 PIR thermal insulation. The work was carried out by Harley Fronts of Crowborough, East Sussex, at a cost of £2.6 million.[9]​.

Initial fire (00:50-01:15)

The fire started in the early hours of Wednesday 14 June 2017, around 00:50 BST (UTC+1), when a fridge-freezer on the 16th floor, located on the fourth floor, caught fire. The resident of the flat, Behailu Kebede, was awakened by a smoke alarm. After entering the kitchen and discovering that the refrigerator was smoking, he alerted his tenants and neighbors and called the fire brigade at 00:54,[10][11] The first two fire engines from the London Fire Service (LFB) arrived six minutes later.[12][13] The initial incident commander said that the fire was visible at that time as a "glow" in the window.[14]​ Two others were also dispatched. fire engines.[15]​[16]​ Tower residents who called the fire department were told to stay on their floors unless they were affected, which is the usual policy in skyscraper fires[10]​ as each floor must be protected from its neighbors. Also due to this policy, the building lacked a central fire alarm.

After most of the firefighters entered the building, a bridgehead (internal base of operations) was established on the second floor, connecting hoses to the dry riser. They entered the 16th floor for the first time at 01:07 am. It was another seven minutes before they began to put out the kitchen fire. At approximately 01:08, the fire began to penetrate the window frame and within minutes set fire to the surrounding cladding panels.[16]​ In view of this, the incident commander requested two more pumps and an aerial apparatus at 01:13, which also led to the dispatch of more senior officers, a fire investigation unit and two command vehicles.[16]​ Another firefighter was asked to try to prevent it from spreading with a water jet, although This jet could not reach higher than the fourth floor and, due to fear of causing a dangerous accumulation of steam inside, it was not directed directly at the window.[17]​.

Rapid upward propagation (01:15-01:30)

As firefighters began to extinguish the kitchen fire, a column of flames moved rapidly up the side of the building. At 01:15, one firefighter discovered smoke on the 26th floor (just above the 16th floor), another discovered residents who had fled the smoke on the fifth and sixth floors, and outside large amounts of debris began to fall from the burning façade.[16] The flames spread down the side at a "frightening speed."[16] Attempts to combat the fire with an external jet were unsuccessful, as most of it was burning. behind the waterproof screen.[18]​ By 01:30, a rising column of flames had reached the roof and the fire was growing out of control.[19]​[16]​ The fire on the east exterior spread laterally and carried smoke and flames to several floors.[20]​[18]​[21]​[22]​.

By 01:18, 34 of the 293 residents had escaped,[10] The busiest evacuation phase occurred between 01:18 and 01:38, when 110 people escaped,[10] many of them awakened by their smoke alarms when smoke entered their floor. Due to Ramadan, many Muslim residents were awake for the pre-dawn suhoor meal, allowing them to alert neighbors.[23][24]​.

LFB rapidly escalated its response during this time period. The number of bombs present increased from six to eight at 01:19, with the dispatch of a specialist fire rescue unit, a bulk breathing apparatus carrier and a damage control unit. At 01:24 the number of bombs was raised to 10, and at 01:27 to 15, together with a second aerial platform. Two minutes later, two more fire and two rescue units were mobilized, and at 01:35 25 were reached, which also prompted the dispatch of a deputy commissioner. Dany Cotton, commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, also received a call and began traveling to the scene from his home in Kent. The London Metropolitan Police (MPS) received a call at 01:24 to control the crowd gathering outside.[16]​ Five minutes later, the London Ambulance Service also received a call.[16]​.

Trapped residents and rescue missions (01:30-02:04)

Because the fire doors were not properly closed and sealed, smoke began to spread from the affected floors into the lobbies.[15] At 01:33, LFB was receiving calls from residents reporting they were trapped on their floors.[16] At some point between 01:30 and 01:40, smoke began to enter the stairwell.[10] The investigation later estimated that, Despite this, the stairs remained passable for more than half an hour.[25] The pace of evacuation slowed, and 20 people escaped between 01:38 and 01:58.[10] More than half of those still trapped at 01:58 died, while 48 were rescued between 01:58 and 03:58.[10] The fire continued. spreading laterally on the outside, and at 01:42 it had reached the north side.[15]​.

LFB officers collected information from trapped residents and transmitted it to the LFB command unit stationed outside. Radio communication was difficult due to noise, the volume of conversations and possibly the concrete structure of the building. Instead, details of the trapped residents were written on pieces of paper that were transported by runners from the command unit to the bridgehead on the second floor. At the bridgehead, arriving firefighters were assigned the floors they should go to and informed who they were to rescue.[26] They put on breathing apparatus and headed to the floor to search for its residents.

Firefighters encountered thick smoke, zero visibility, and extreme heat when they climbed above the fourth floor.[13][27] Additionally, some residents had moved locations to escape the smoke. Three firefighters who went to rescue a 12-year-old girl on the 20th floor could not find her. Unknown to them, the girl had moved to a floor on the 23rd floor, was talking on the phone with a control operator who did not know what the firefighters were doing[16]​ and died there.[28]​ Two other firefighters were sent to a floor on the 14th floor with a single resident, where they found 8 people (four of whom ended up escaping).[29]​.

Serious incident declared (02:04-04:00)

As the fire spread rapidly through the building, witnesses at the scene reported seeing trapped residents turning lights on and off in their apartments or waving from windows for help, some holding children in their arms, as well as hearing residents screaming from all sides of the tower. Eyewitnesses reported seeing some people jump to their deaths, and four victims were later found to have died from "injuries consistent with falling from a height."[30]​[31]​ These deaths were classified as "suicides", despite being a direct consequence of the fire. At least one person used knotted blankets to make a rope to escape the burning building.[32] Frequent explosions were heard, reportedly coming from the building's gas pipes.[13]

Operations outside were hampered by falling debris, including pieces of burning siding. Because of this danger, police moved the crowd away from the building as a safety precaution. The MPS Territorial Support Group was present; in addition to being a unit specialized in policing public order"), it provided riot shields to protect firefighters from falling debris.[33]​.

Shortly after 02:00, a serious incident was declared and the number of fire engines increased from 25 to 40, the number of rescue units increased to 10, command vehicles to six, aerial platforms to four and operational support units to two. Over the course of the operation, 250 firefighters attempted to control the fire, with over 100 firefighters inside the building at any one time. Deputy Commissioner Andrew Roe assumed direct command of firefighting operations for the next 11 hours. Instead of directly directing operations, Commissioner Cotton acted as Control Officer, supervising Roe and providing moral support to the firefighters. He admitted that the LFB had breached its own safety protocols by entering a large building without knowing whether it was in danger of structural collapse.[35] It was not until the following afternoon that structural engineers were able to assess the structure and determine that it was not in danger of collapsing.[13]

By 02:20, the level of smoke in the stairwell was life-threatening, although some survivors managed to escape.[25] At 02:47, the "stay-away" policy, which advised residents in areas not affected by the flames to remain there, was abandoned in favor of general evacuation.[36] From then on, only 36 additional residents were able to escape. Experts involved in the subsequent investigation into the disaster later stated that the "no move" policy should have been scrapped an hour and twenty minutes earlier than it was ultimately done.[37]

Final rescues (04:00-08:07)

At dawn, firefighters were still busy fighting the fire and attempting rescues inside. At 04:14, police addressed the large crowd of onlookers and urgently ordered them to contact anyone they knew who was trapped in the building - if they could reach them by phone or Twitter - to tell them that they should try to self-evacuate and not wait for the firefighters.[38] By 04:44, all sides of the building had been affected.[15]

Only two more rescues occurred: one resident was rescued at 06:05 and the last was rescued at 08:07.[15] Firefighters rescued all remaining residents to the 10th floor and all but two to the 12th floor, but none reached higher than the 20th floor during this time; only two people escaped from the two highest floors.[10]​.

Residual fire (08:07 - June 16)

In a press conference on the afternoon of 14 June, the LFB reported that firefighters had rescued 65 people from the building and had reached all 24 floors.[39]​ The NHS confirmed that 74 people were in six London hospitals, 20 of them in a critical condition.[40]​.

The fire continued to burn on the upper floors of the tower. It was not brought under control until 01:14 on June 15 and firefighters were still putting out the fire when the brigade issued an update on June 16. Firefighters also used a drone to inspect the building and search for victims. The fire was declared out on the afternoon of June 16.

Grenfell Tower works manager Michael Lockwood explained at a public meeting on 26 July 2017 that the building would be covered with a protective envelope supported by scaffolding. This is to protect forensic evidence, but would later allow the building to be dismantled. The community will be consulted on how the space should be used after the demolition.[44]​.

As of February 2024, deconstruction had not yet begun, more than six years later. Structural engineers have warned that the tower poses a risk. The government has said the tower must be "carefully taken down".[45] Plans for the site are expected to be published by the Grenfell Tower Memorial Commission, established in 2018.[46] Lockwood and Thelma Stober were elected co-chairs in 2020.[47]

On 5 February 2025, Angela Rayner, Deputy Prime Minister, informed relatives and survivors of the victims that the decision had been made to demolish Grenfell Tower.[48] Plans were confirmed on 7 February 2025, and the dismantling of the tower was expected to take two years.[49]

Refrigerator

Police confirmed on 23 June that a faulty refrigerator had initially caused the fire, noting that it was model FF175BP, manufactured by Indesit under the Hotpoint brand.[50] Owners of the FF175BP and FF175BG models were urged to register their appliance with the manufacturer to receive updates. Sixty-four thousand of these models were manufactured between March 2006 and July 2009, after which the model was discontinued. It is unknown how many are still in use.[51]​.

The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) commissioned an investigation into the safety of the Hotpoint FF175B refrigerator. Independent experts examined the remains of the aircraft recovered from Grenfell and exemplary models of the same type. They concluded that the design met all legal safety requirements and that there was no need to withdraw the model from the market. The Consumers' Association complained that the legal requirements were inadequate.[52][53]​.

Tenants had repeatedly complained that power surges caused appliances to smoke, and such a surge could have set the refrigerator-freezer on fire. The council was aware of the complaints and had compensated the tenants for the damaged appliances. However, the surges continued. Judith Blakeman, the town's Labor councillor, says power surges affect many appliances, including refrigerators. Blakeman maintains that the cause of the surges was never resolved.[54]​.

On 27 November 2018, evidence given to the Grenfell Tower inquiry by electrical investigative engineer J. Duncan Glover suggested that on the 16th floor the refrigerator compressor relay wiring was not properly tightened. In his opinion, this likely created additional electrical resistance that caused the cable's outer plastic insulation to overheat and ignite at 90°C (200°F). Glover described the condition of the fuse box after a compressor short circuit. During cross-examination, he compared US and UK safety standards, pointing out that US regulations require the back of the refrigerator to be made of steel to help contain fire, while the UK only allowed refrigerators to have a plastic back.[55]​.

Exterior coating and insulation

The new renovated façade of the tower is believed to have been constructed as follows:[58]​.

• - outer covering: aluminum sandwich plates with polyethylene core (3 mm (0.12 inches) each).

• - a standard ventilation gap (50 mm) between the cladding and the back insulation.

• - an insulation of PIR (polyisocyanurate) foam plates (150 mm) mounted on the existing façade.

• - the existing prefabricated reinforced concrete façade.

• - new double-glazed windows of unknown type and material, mounted in the same vertical plane as the PIR foam insulation boards[59]​.

Both the aluminum-polyethylene cladding and the PIR insulation boards failed fire safety tests carried out after the fire, according to the police.[60]​.

Previously, in 2014, safety experts had warned that the planned insulation was only suitable for use with non-combustible cladding. The Guardian saw a certificate from the building inspection organisation, Local Authority Building Control (LABC), stating that the insulation chosen for the renovation should only be used in tall buildings with fiber cement panels, which do not burn. Combustible panels with polyethylene were placed over an insulation known as Celotex RS5000, made of polyisocyanurate, which burns when heated and gives off toxic cyanide fumes. Despite this, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea certified the Grenfell Tower works as supposedly complying with "the relevant provisions." Council building inspectors visited the site 16 times between August 2014 and July 2016. Kooltherm, a phenolic insulator, was also used at Grenfell. Kooltherm has never been tested with polyethylene-core aluminum panels, according to the manufacturer. The manufacturer, Kingspan, "would be very surprised if such a system... ever passed the appropriate full-scale test of British Standard 8414." Kooltherm's LABC certificate states that phenolic products "do not meet the limited combustibility requirements" of building regulations.[61]​.

The combustible materials used in Grenfell Tower were considerably cheaper than non-combustible alternatives would have been. The renovation of Grenfell Tower appears to have been under severe cost pressure. In June 2017, it was claimed that the project team chose a cheaper cladding which resulted in a saving of £293,368, after the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization mentioned in an email the need for "good costs for Cllr Feilding-Mellen [former vice-chairman of the council]".[61][62]​.

A building control officer from the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea reportedly approved the cladding of Grenfell Tower on 15 May 2015, although there was a national warning that the combustible insulation used should only be used with non-burning cladding.[63]​.

Aluminum-polyethylene coating

Fire safety experts noted that the building's new exterior cladding was one of the possible causes of the rapid spread of the fire.[66] According to experts, the gap between the cladding and the insulation functioned as a "chimney effect" to spread the fire.[59]The cladding could be seen burning and melting, leading to speculation that it was not made of a fire-resistant material. One resident said: "One whole side of the building was on fire. The siding was burning like a match."[67]

Concern about the dangers of external cladding had already arisen years before, after the fire of some flats in Knowsley Heights (Merseyside) in 1991.[68]​[69]​[68]​[70]​[71]​[72]​.

Records show that a contractor was paid £2.6 million to install an "ACM rainscreen cladding" during the recent refurbishment of Grenfell Tower.[73]​ ACM stands for "aluminum composite material", also known as a sandwich panel, the combustibility of which depends on the choice of insulating core material.[68]​.

One of the products used was Arconic's Reynobond, which is available with different types of core material: polyethylene, such as that used on Grenfell Tower (Reynobond PE), or a more fire-resistant material (Reynobond FR).[74]​[75]​ The Reynobond cladding reportedly cost £24 per square meter (£20 per square yard) for the fireproof version, and £22 pounds) for the fuel version.[75]​.

According to Arconic's website and brochure for the continental European market at the time of the fire, the Reynobond PE cladding used was only suitable for buildings 10 meters (30') high or less; fire-retardant Reynobond FR was suitable for buildings up to 30 meters (100') high; and above this last height, like the upper parts of Grenfell Tower, the A2 non-combustible version was to be used ("As soon as the building is higher than the fire brigade stairs, it must be designed with a non-combustible material").[76]​[77]​[78]​ Following the fire, Arconic stopped selling Reynobond PE worldwide for tower blocks.[79]​.

Similar cladding with highly flammable insulation material is believed to have been installed on thousands of other high-rise buildings in countries including Britain, France, the UAE and Australia.[70]​[80]​ The Center for Window and Cladding Technology advises that when such materials are used on buildings taller than 18 metres, the fire performance of the cladding system as a whole should be demonstrated by testing.[81]​.

In September 2014, a building regulations notice for cladding works was submitted to the authority, marked "Completed - not approved".[82]​ The use of a "building notice" building control application is used to remove the need to submit detailed plans and proposals in advance to a building control inspector, where the works carried out will be approved by the inspector during the course of construction. Building inspector Geoff Wilkinson noted that this type of application is "wholly inappropriate for large complex buildings and should only be used on small, simple domestic buildings".[83]

Polyisocyanurate insulation

The renovation also used a foam insulation product called Celotex RS5000, installed behind the cladding.[97]​ Police said this insulation proved to be "more flammable than the cladding."[98]​.

According to its technical data sheet, the polyisocyanurate (PIR) product - whose charred pieces were scattered around Grenfell Tower after the fire - "will burn if exposed to a fire of sufficient heat and intensity". hydrogen.[100]​ The toxicity of polyisocyanurate foams in the event of fire has been well known for some time.[101]​.

At least three survivors were treated for cyanide poisoning.[102] Simultaneous exposure to carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide is more lethal than exposure to both gases separately.[103]

The Celotex Waterproofing Standards Compliance Guide specifies Celotex RS5000 in buildings over 18 meters (59 feet),[104]​ sets out the conditions under which the product has been tested and certified to meet required fire safety standards. These conditions include the use of 12 mm (0.47 inch) fiber cement panels (non-combustible), ventilated horizontal firewalls at each edge of the floor, and non-ventilated vertical firewalls. It is indicated that any changes with respect to the tested configuration "should be considered by the building designer."

Cavity barriers

It has been claimed that cavity barriers intended to prevent the spread of fire in the gap between the façade and the building (chimney effect) were insufficient in size and, in some cases, poorly installed, which facilitated the spread of fire.[105]​.

Windows

It has been claimed that the windows and their frames installed as part of the renovation were less fire resistant than those they replaced due to the materials used and that the windows were undersized, requiring larger frames. This would facilitate the spread of fire between the interior and exterior of the building.[105]​.

• - Valencia Fire of 2024.

• - Wikimedia Commons hosts a multimedia category on Grenfell Tower Fire.

• - This work contains a translation derived from «Grenfell Tower fire» from English Wikipedia, published by its editors under the GNU Free Documentation License and the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

• - The cause of the London fire was a defective refrigerator that caught fire La Vanguardia (06/26/2017).

• - The Grenfell Tower fire, a symbol of what is rotten in the United Kingdom La Vanguardia (06/19/2017).

• - The ghost of Grenfell Tower is projected onto the El Mundo Bell Tower (February 23, 2024).

• - The great similarities between the building fire in Valencia and that of the Grenfell tower in London Cadena Ser (02/23/2024).

The 24-storey tower block was designed in 1967 in the brutalist style of the period by Clifford Wearden and Associates, with the council approving its construction in 1970 as part of phase one of the Lancaster West redevelopment project.

Construction by contractors A E Symes, of Leyton, London, began in 1972 under the council housing scheme and was completed in 1974. The building, 67 meters high, contained 120 one and two-bedroom apartments (six flats per floor on twenty of the twenty-four floors, with the other four used for non-residential purposes), housing up to 600 people in the tower, and was renovated in 2015-16. Like many other high-rise buildings in the United Kingdom, the tower had only one staircase—unlike many other countries—since British regulations do not require a second staircase.

Plans for the tower's renovation were published in 2012.[6]​ Overseen by Studio E Architects,[7]​ The renovation cost £8.7 million,[8]​ carried out by Rydon Ltd, of Forest Row, East Sussex in conjunction with Artelia for contract administration and Max Fordham as specialist mechanical and electrical consultants. Completed in 2016. As part of the project, in 2015-2016, the concrete structure received new windows and new aluminum composite cladding, in part to improve the appearance of the building.

Two types were used: Arconic's Reynobond, which consists of two coil-coated aluminum sheets that are fusion bonded to both sides of a polyethylene core; and Reynolux. Below these, and fixed to the outside of the flat walls, was Celotex RS5000 PIR thermal insulation. The work was carried out by Harley Fronts of Crowborough, East Sussex, at a cost of £2.6 million.[9]​.

Initial fire (00:50-01:15)

The fire started in the early hours of Wednesday 14 June 2017, around 00:50 BST (UTC+1), when a fridge-freezer on the 16th floor, located on the fourth floor, caught fire. The resident of the flat, Behailu Kebede, was awakened by a smoke alarm. After entering the kitchen and discovering that the refrigerator was smoking, he alerted his tenants and neighbors and called the fire brigade at 00:54,[10][11] The first two fire engines from the London Fire Service (LFB) arrived six minutes later.[12][13] The initial incident commander said that the fire was visible at that time as a "glow" in the window.[14]​ Two others were also dispatched. fire engines.[15]​[16]​ Tower residents who called the fire department were told to stay on their floors unless they were affected, which is the usual policy in skyscraper fires[10]​ as each floor must be protected from its neighbors. Also due to this policy, the building lacked a central fire alarm.

After most of the firefighters entered the building, a bridgehead (internal base of operations) was established on the second floor, connecting hoses to the dry riser. They entered the 16th floor for the first time at 01:07 am. It was another seven minutes before they began to put out the kitchen fire. At approximately 01:08, the fire began to penetrate the window frame and within minutes set fire to the surrounding cladding panels.[16]​ In view of this, the incident commander requested two more pumps and an aerial apparatus at 01:13, which also led to the dispatch of more senior officers, a fire investigation unit and two command vehicles.[16]​ Another firefighter was asked to try to prevent it from spreading with a water jet, although This jet could not reach higher than the fourth floor and, due to fear of causing a dangerous accumulation of steam inside, it was not directed directly at the window.[17]​.

Rapid upward propagation (01:15-01:30)

As firefighters began to extinguish the kitchen fire, a column of flames moved rapidly up the side of the building. At 01:15, one firefighter discovered smoke on the 26th floor (just above the 16th floor), another discovered residents who had fled the smoke on the fifth and sixth floors, and outside large amounts of debris began to fall from the burning façade.[16] The flames spread down the side at a "frightening speed."[16] Attempts to combat the fire with an external jet were unsuccessful, as most of it was burning. behind the waterproof screen.[18]​ By 01:30, a rising column of flames had reached the roof and the fire was growing out of control.[19]​[16]​ The fire on the east exterior spread laterally and carried smoke and flames to several floors.[20]​[18]​[21]​[22]​.

By 01:18, 34 of the 293 residents had escaped,[10] The busiest evacuation phase occurred between 01:18 and 01:38, when 110 people escaped,[10] many of them awakened by their smoke alarms when smoke entered their floor. Due to Ramadan, many Muslim residents were awake for the pre-dawn suhoor meal, allowing them to alert neighbors.[23][24]​.

LFB rapidly escalated its response during this time period. The number of bombs present increased from six to eight at 01:19, with the dispatch of a specialist fire rescue unit, a bulk breathing apparatus carrier and a damage control unit. At 01:24 the number of bombs was raised to 10, and at 01:27 to 15, together with a second aerial platform. Two minutes later, two more fire and two rescue units were mobilized, and at 01:35 25 were reached, which also prompted the dispatch of a deputy commissioner. Dany Cotton, commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, also received a call and began traveling to the scene from his home in Kent. The London Metropolitan Police (MPS) received a call at 01:24 to control the crowd gathering outside.[16]​ Five minutes later, the London Ambulance Service also received a call.[16]​.

Trapped residents and rescue missions (01:30-02:04)

Because the fire doors were not properly closed and sealed, smoke began to spread from the affected floors into the lobbies.[15] At 01:33, LFB was receiving calls from residents reporting they were trapped on their floors.[16] At some point between 01:30 and 01:40, smoke began to enter the stairwell.[10] The investigation later estimated that, Despite this, the stairs remained passable for more than half an hour.[25] The pace of evacuation slowed, and 20 people escaped between 01:38 and 01:58.[10] More than half of those still trapped at 01:58 died, while 48 were rescued between 01:58 and 03:58.[10] The fire continued. spreading laterally on the outside, and at 01:42 it had reached the north side.[15]​.

LFB officers collected information from trapped residents and transmitted it to the LFB command unit stationed outside. Radio communication was difficult due to noise, the volume of conversations and possibly the concrete structure of the building. Instead, details of the trapped residents were written on pieces of paper that were transported by runners from the command unit to the bridgehead on the second floor. At the bridgehead, arriving firefighters were assigned the floors they should go to and informed who they were to rescue.[26] They put on breathing apparatus and headed to the floor to search for its residents.

Firefighters encountered thick smoke, zero visibility, and extreme heat when they climbed above the fourth floor.[13][27] Additionally, some residents had moved locations to escape the smoke. Three firefighters who went to rescue a 12-year-old girl on the 20th floor could not find her. Unknown to them, the girl had moved to a floor on the 23rd floor, was talking on the phone with a control operator who did not know what the firefighters were doing[16]​ and died there.[28]​ Two other firefighters were sent to a floor on the 14th floor with a single resident, where they found 8 people (four of whom ended up escaping).[29]​.

Serious incident declared (02:04-04:00)

As the fire spread rapidly through the building, witnesses at the scene reported seeing trapped residents turning lights on and off in their apartments or waving from windows for help, some holding children in their arms, as well as hearing residents screaming from all sides of the tower. Eyewitnesses reported seeing some people jump to their deaths, and four victims were later found to have died from "injuries consistent with falling from a height."[30]​[31]​ These deaths were classified as "suicides", despite being a direct consequence of the fire. At least one person used knotted blankets to make a rope to escape the burning building.[32] Frequent explosions were heard, reportedly coming from the building's gas pipes.[13]

Operations outside were hampered by falling debris, including pieces of burning siding. Because of this danger, police moved the crowd away from the building as a safety precaution. The MPS Territorial Support Group was present; in addition to being a unit specialized in policing public order"), it provided riot shields to protect firefighters from falling debris.[33]​.

Shortly after 02:00, a serious incident was declared and the number of fire engines increased from 25 to 40, the number of rescue units increased to 10, command vehicles to six, aerial platforms to four and operational support units to two. Over the course of the operation, 250 firefighters attempted to control the fire, with over 100 firefighters inside the building at any one time. Deputy Commissioner Andrew Roe assumed direct command of firefighting operations for the next 11 hours. Instead of directly directing operations, Commissioner Cotton acted as Control Officer, supervising Roe and providing moral support to the firefighters. He admitted that the LFB had breached its own safety protocols by entering a large building without knowing whether it was in danger of structural collapse.[35] It was not until the following afternoon that structural engineers were able to assess the structure and determine that it was not in danger of collapsing.[13]

By 02:20, the level of smoke in the stairwell was life-threatening, although some survivors managed to escape.[25] At 02:47, the "stay-away" policy, which advised residents in areas not affected by the flames to remain there, was abandoned in favor of general evacuation.[36] From then on, only 36 additional residents were able to escape. Experts involved in the subsequent investigation into the disaster later stated that the "no move" policy should have been scrapped an hour and twenty minutes earlier than it was ultimately done.[37]

Final rescues (04:00-08:07)

At dawn, firefighters were still busy fighting the fire and attempting rescues inside. At 04:14, police addressed the large crowd of onlookers and urgently ordered them to contact anyone they knew who was trapped in the building - if they could reach them by phone or Twitter - to tell them that they should try to self-evacuate and not wait for the firefighters.[38] By 04:44, all sides of the building had been affected.[15]

Only two more rescues occurred: one resident was rescued at 06:05 and the last was rescued at 08:07.[15] Firefighters rescued all remaining residents to the 10th floor and all but two to the 12th floor, but none reached higher than the 20th floor during this time; only two people escaped from the two highest floors.[10]​.

Residual fire (08:07 - June 16)

In a press conference on the afternoon of 14 June, the LFB reported that firefighters had rescued 65 people from the building and had reached all 24 floors.[39]​ The NHS confirmed that 74 people were in six London hospitals, 20 of them in a critical condition.[40]​.

The fire continued to burn on the upper floors of the tower. It was not brought under control until 01:14 on June 15 and firefighters were still putting out the fire when the brigade issued an update on June 16. Firefighters also used a drone to inspect the building and search for victims. The fire was declared out on the afternoon of June 16.

Grenfell Tower works manager Michael Lockwood explained at a public meeting on 26 July 2017 that the building would be covered with a protective envelope supported by scaffolding. This is to protect forensic evidence, but would later allow the building to be dismantled. The community will be consulted on how the space should be used after the demolition.[44]​.

As of February 2024, deconstruction had not yet begun, more than six years later. Structural engineers have warned that the tower poses a risk. The government has said the tower must be "carefully taken down".[45] Plans for the site are expected to be published by the Grenfell Tower Memorial Commission, established in 2018.[46] Lockwood and Thelma Stober were elected co-chairs in 2020.[47]

On 5 February 2025, Angela Rayner, Deputy Prime Minister, informed relatives and survivors of the victims that the decision had been made to demolish Grenfell Tower.[48] Plans were confirmed on 7 February 2025, and the dismantling of the tower was expected to take two years.[49]

Refrigerator

Police confirmed on 23 June that a faulty refrigerator had initially caused the fire, noting that it was model FF175BP, manufactured by Indesit under the Hotpoint brand.[50] Owners of the FF175BP and FF175BG models were urged to register their appliance with the manufacturer to receive updates. Sixty-four thousand of these models were manufactured between March 2006 and July 2009, after which the model was discontinued. It is unknown how many are still in use.[51]​.

The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) commissioned an investigation into the safety of the Hotpoint FF175B refrigerator. Independent experts examined the remains of the aircraft recovered from Grenfell and exemplary models of the same type. They concluded that the design met all legal safety requirements and that there was no need to withdraw the model from the market. The Consumers' Association complained that the legal requirements were inadequate.[52][53]​.

Tenants had repeatedly complained that power surges caused appliances to smoke, and such a surge could have set the refrigerator-freezer on fire. The council was aware of the complaints and had compensated the tenants for the damaged appliances. However, the surges continued. Judith Blakeman, the town's Labor councillor, says power surges affect many appliances, including refrigerators. Blakeman maintains that the cause of the surges was never resolved.[54]​.

On 27 November 2018, evidence given to the Grenfell Tower inquiry by electrical investigative engineer J. Duncan Glover suggested that on the 16th floor the refrigerator compressor relay wiring was not properly tightened. In his opinion, this likely created additional electrical resistance that caused the cable's outer plastic insulation to overheat and ignite at 90°C (200°F). Glover described the condition of the fuse box after a compressor short circuit. During cross-examination, he compared US and UK safety standards, pointing out that US regulations require the back of the refrigerator to be made of steel to help contain fire, while the UK only allowed refrigerators to have a plastic back.[55]​.

Exterior coating and insulation

The new renovated façade of the tower is believed to have been constructed as follows:[58]​.

• - outer covering: aluminum sandwich plates with polyethylene core (3 mm (0.12 inches) each).

• - a standard ventilation gap (50 mm) between the cladding and the back insulation.

• - an insulation of PIR (polyisocyanurate) foam plates (150 mm) mounted on the existing façade.

• - the existing prefabricated reinforced concrete façade.

• - new double-glazed windows of unknown type and material, mounted in the same vertical plane as the PIR foam insulation boards[59]​.

Both the aluminum-polyethylene cladding and the PIR insulation boards failed fire safety tests carried out after the fire, according to the police.[60]​.

Previously, in 2014, safety experts had warned that the planned insulation was only suitable for use with non-combustible cladding. The Guardian saw a certificate from the building inspection organisation, Local Authority Building Control (LABC), stating that the insulation chosen for the renovation should only be used in tall buildings with fiber cement panels, which do not burn. Combustible panels with polyethylene were placed over an insulation known as Celotex RS5000, made of polyisocyanurate, which burns when heated and gives off toxic cyanide fumes. Despite this, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea certified the Grenfell Tower works as supposedly complying with "the relevant provisions." Council building inspectors visited the site 16 times between August 2014 and July 2016. Kooltherm, a phenolic insulator, was also used at Grenfell. Kooltherm has never been tested with polyethylene-core aluminum panels, according to the manufacturer. The manufacturer, Kingspan, "would be very surprised if such a system... ever passed the appropriate full-scale test of British Standard 8414." Kooltherm's LABC certificate states that phenolic products "do not meet the limited combustibility requirements" of building regulations.[61]​.

The combustible materials used in Grenfell Tower were considerably cheaper than non-combustible alternatives would have been. The renovation of Grenfell Tower appears to have been under severe cost pressure. In June 2017, it was claimed that the project team chose a cheaper cladding which resulted in a saving of £293,368, after the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization mentioned in an email the need for "good costs for Cllr Feilding-Mellen [former vice-chairman of the council]".[61][62]​.

A building control officer from the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea reportedly approved the cladding of Grenfell Tower on 15 May 2015, although there was a national warning that the combustible insulation used should only be used with non-burning cladding.[63]​.

Aluminum-polyethylene coating

Fire safety experts noted that the building's new exterior cladding was one of the possible causes of the rapid spread of the fire.[66] According to experts, the gap between the cladding and the insulation functioned as a "chimney effect" to spread the fire.[59]The cladding could be seen burning and melting, leading to speculation that it was not made of a fire-resistant material. One resident said: "One whole side of the building was on fire. The siding was burning like a match."[67]

Concern about the dangers of external cladding had already arisen years before, after the fire of some flats in Knowsley Heights (Merseyside) in 1991.[68]​[69]​[68]​[70]​[71]​[72]​.

Records show that a contractor was paid £2.6 million to install an "ACM rainscreen cladding" during the recent refurbishment of Grenfell Tower.[73]​ ACM stands for "aluminum composite material", also known as a sandwich panel, the combustibility of which depends on the choice of insulating core material.[68]​.

One of the products used was Arconic's Reynobond, which is available with different types of core material: polyethylene, such as that used on Grenfell Tower (Reynobond PE), or a more fire-resistant material (Reynobond FR).[74]​[75]​ The Reynobond cladding reportedly cost £24 per square meter (£20 per square yard) for the fireproof version, and £22 pounds) for the fuel version.[75]​.

According to Arconic's website and brochure for the continental European market at the time of the fire, the Reynobond PE cladding used was only suitable for buildings 10 meters (30') high or less; fire-retardant Reynobond FR was suitable for buildings up to 30 meters (100') high; and above this last height, like the upper parts of Grenfell Tower, the A2 non-combustible version was to be used ("As soon as the building is higher than the fire brigade stairs, it must be designed with a non-combustible material").[76]​[77]​[78]​ Following the fire, Arconic stopped selling Reynobond PE worldwide for tower blocks.[79]​.

Similar cladding with highly flammable insulation material is believed to have been installed on thousands of other high-rise buildings in countries including Britain, France, the UAE and Australia.[70]​[80]​ The Center for Window and Cladding Technology advises that when such materials are used on buildings taller than 18 metres, the fire performance of the cladding system as a whole should be demonstrated by testing.[81]​.

In September 2014, a building regulations notice for cladding works was submitted to the authority, marked "Completed - not approved".[82]​ The use of a "building notice" building control application is used to remove the need to submit detailed plans and proposals in advance to a building control inspector, where the works carried out will be approved by the inspector during the course of construction. Building inspector Geoff Wilkinson noted that this type of application is "wholly inappropriate for large complex buildings and should only be used on small, simple domestic buildings".[83]

Polyisocyanurate insulation

The renovation also used a foam insulation product called Celotex RS5000, installed behind the cladding.[97]​ Police said this insulation proved to be "more flammable than the cladding."[98]​.

According to its technical data sheet, the polyisocyanurate (PIR) product - whose charred pieces were scattered around Grenfell Tower after the fire - "will burn if exposed to a fire of sufficient heat and intensity". hydrogen.[100]​ The toxicity of polyisocyanurate foams in the event of fire has been well known for some time.[101]​.

At least three survivors were treated for cyanide poisoning.[102] Simultaneous exposure to carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide is more lethal than exposure to both gases separately.[103]

The Celotex Waterproofing Standards Compliance Guide specifies Celotex RS5000 in buildings over 18 meters (59 feet),[104]​ sets out the conditions under which the product has been tested and certified to meet required fire safety standards. These conditions include the use of 12 mm (0.47 inch) fiber cement panels (non-combustible), ventilated horizontal firewalls at each edge of the floor, and non-ventilated vertical firewalls. It is indicated that any changes with respect to the tested configuration "should be considered by the building designer."

Cavity barriers

It has been claimed that cavity barriers intended to prevent the spread of fire in the gap between the façade and the building (chimney effect) were insufficient in size and, in some cases, poorly installed, which facilitated the spread of fire.[105]​.

Windows

It has been claimed that the windows and their frames installed as part of the renovation were less fire resistant than those they replaced due to the materials used and that the windows were undersized, requiring larger frames. This would facilitate the spread of fire between the interior and exterior of the building.[105]​.

• - Valencia Fire of 2024.

• - Wikimedia Commons hosts a multimedia category on Grenfell Tower Fire.

• - This work contains a translation derived from «Grenfell Tower fire» from English Wikipedia, published by its editors under the GNU Free Documentation License and the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

• - The cause of the London fire was a defective refrigerator that caught fire La Vanguardia (06/26/2017).

• - The Grenfell Tower fire, a symbol of what is rotten in the United Kingdom La Vanguardia (06/19/2017).

• - The ghost of Grenfell Tower is projected onto the El Mundo Bell Tower (February 23, 2024).

• - The great similarities between the building fire in Valencia and that of the Grenfell tower in London Cadena Ser (02/23/2024).