The Uluj Alí expedition and the preparations of the Marquis of the Vélez

The corsair expedition against the Spanish Levant in the spring of 1561 is an event for which a partial historical record is managed, since the sources analyzed by historiography exclusively reflect the Spanish perspective. Unlike the raid carried out by Dragut in 1550, this episode also lacks a comprehensive narrative, resulting in a fragmentary knowledge of it that prevents specifying aspects such as the exact date of departure from Algiers, the moment of arrival in the Iberian southeast or details about its journey along the Alicante coast. Despite this, the comparison with the usual patterns of privateer campaigns allows us to plausibly reconstruct its stages and characteristics. By 1561, the Regency of Algiers was once again governed by Hasan Pasha, son of Barbarossa, who had held the title of beylerbey since June 1557, after the death of his predecessor Salah Reis during the plague epidemic that had devastated Algiers since June 1556. Given that in the period 1561-1564 the Ottoman navy barely left port, the organization of this The raid exemplifies the wide degree of autonomy that the Algerian sailors enjoyed with respect to Sultan Suleiman.[85]​ The most favorable time for an expedition was the period between late spring and early autumn, taking advantage of the favorable weather conditions and reserving the rest of the year to winter the ships and commission maintenance work by caulkers and shore carpenters—mostly Christian slaves—along with specialized Moorish workers.[86]​ The The main objective of the company was to capture any ships that accidentally crossed paths and carry out raids on inhabited areas near the coast to capture the largest possible number of Christians and supply with them the lucrative slave market of Algiers, without ruling out the looting of urban centers or the evacuation of Moors.[87] As for the theater of operations, it was divided into two areas: "Western", which included the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands; and "Levante", which corresponded to Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and the coasts of the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas. During the beginning of the war season, almost all of the 12,000 soldiers in the Algiers garrison embarked, leaving only a small detachment on guard.[88]

In 1561, the expedition to "Western" fell under the direction of the arraeces Uluj Alí and Yusuf Rais,[j]​ the latter a figure practically unknown outside of the chronicles related to this campaign.[3]​ Uluj Alí, baptized as Giovanni Dionigi Galeni, was approximately 41 years old and was a renegade of Italian origin born in Calabria—Kingdom of Naples—, in The bosom of a Christian family made up of his father, the fisherman Birno Galeni, and his mother Pippa de Cicco. and changing his name to Uluj Alí - "Alí the Renegade". Over time, he managed to acquire a stake in a privateer brig, the performance of which brought him significant financial benefits. He was thus able to climb socially in Algiers, marry the daughter of his former master and obtain a marquee license, and since then he has carried out successful attacks on the Italian coast, in which his new name was phonetically deformed to "Occhiali". during the decades of 1540 and 1550. In 1560 he placed himself under the orders of Piali Pasha in the destruction of the Christian navy that had threatened Dragut, and the following year, while his partner counterattacked with a campaign against "Levant" in which he would subject the port of Naples to a naval blockade "Blockade (strategy)"), Uluj Ali would launch an attack towards "Western".[91]

The number of ships that made up the corsair squadron is a cause of dissension among the sources, because although the original notice from Oran numbered 44 ships of the expedition, the chapter minutes of the councils of Lorca - based on reports from the Council of Mojácar - and Cartagena, written during the occurrence of the expedition or in the days immediately following, include statements in which 26 ships are listed, the preferred figure. by Montojo Montojo (1987) and Velasco Hernández (2019).[5]​[92]​ Further numerically and temporally is the scholar Francisco Cascales, who raised the number of Uluj Alí vessels to 36 in 1621.[8]​ The majority of preserved records do not specify the type of ship used by the corsairs, with the exception of those related to the final sacking of Sóller: in that sense, Joan Binimelis in his account of 1595 and the anonymous parish report published in 1888 coincide in stating that they were mostly galley boats accompanied by some galleys, in contrast to Vicente Mut, who describes "galleys and other rowing vessels" in his chronicle of 1650. Christian use, its design sacrificed size and tonnage by virtue of greater speed, making it ideal for quick surprise attack and subsequent escape with the least possible risk. Their artillery was reduced to a larger piece in the bay "Crujía (nautical)") and two others on its sides, in addition to some grinders "Emeril (artillery)") on the sides, and its lightness was enhanced by the fact that only what was strictly necessary was carried on board: provisions, liquid, weapons and ammunition - which is why they needed to frequently make water. The average crew of a twenty-bank galley boat could amount to about 160 men or more, half of them rowers and the other half soldiers and sailors.[96]​.

The usual route of the Barbary expeditions included, once they set sail from Algiers, stopovers in Cherchell, the Habibas Islands or the Chafarinas before crossing to the Iberian Peninsula. Velasco Hernández (2019) assumes that Uluj Alí must have passed through the area of Cabo de Gata in the last days of April, linking it with an incursion documented by Cabrillana Ciézar (1982) on the field of Níjar on those same dates. on the way, to then go to attack a town in the Balearic Islands. It was common for them to look for a sheltered spot where they could be safe from winds and storms and from where they could wait in ambush for the transit of a merchant ship, including the Gata and Cope capes, the port of Portmán or the Grosa and Tabarca islands.[99] Generally, these campaigns rarely exceeded 50 or 60 days, a limit imposed by supplies, and they did not go more than five or six miles inland to avoid the risk of being intercepted by reinforcements from the interior and, above all, facing cavalry.[100] Military intelligence was a key resource for the Algerian arraeces: they knew of the importance of Cartagena as one of the main anchorages of the Spanish Navy, and therefore it was common for them to send spies to ensure the whereabouts of their galleys. Dragut had sent several spies before his attempted landing in 1550, and everything indicates that this practice was also resorted to in 1561.[101] In fact, in 1560 a spy had been captured in Mazarrón with instructions to reach Cartagena and investigate the presence and number of galleys.[102] This was not the only method of obtaining strategic information, however, since the privateers often interrogated the captains of ships from Cartagena that they captured at sea, and there was news that some renegade from Cartagena had come to offer to guide the corsairs in a raid against Mazarrón or the suburb of San Roque, in Cartagena.[103]​.

Counteracting these tactics was precisely the purpose of the firmly established Spanish warning system: the "double presidio" of Oran and Mazalquivir quickly dispatched a brig with the warning to Cartagena as soon as enemy squadrons were sighted, and from there the news spread by land to the coastal towns to the north and south of the city.[104] This happened in the spring of 1561, when thanks to the timely warning from Oran the leaders of the Kingdom of Murcia learned two weeks in advance that a Turkish-Berber fleet had headed towards the Spanish coast. The following movements of the expedition are known thanks to the minutes of the Council of Lorca, which record the receipt of several letters related to it. In the first, on April 24, the Marquis de los Vélez reported the sighting of the Algerian fleet near Oran, "and because they could soon do damage in the city of Cartagena and throughout this coast, [in] especially in the area of ​​Maçarrón, there was no help that could resist it," he ordered the militia to be prepared to leave. On the 30th of the same month, a letter from the Mojácar Council, dated the previous day, warned of the presence of 26 privateer ships in its waters, and therefore begged Lorca for help from 40-50 harquebusiers. It is this letter that allows Velasco Hernández (2019) to conjecture that the expedition had passed Cabo de Gata shortly before that date. On May 2, a new letter from the Marquis of Vélez orders Lorca to send a troop of 200 infantry and 30 cavalry to Mazarrón — where he himself was located — but the next day, when the army was about to march, a final letter was received from the Marquis annulling the previous order, indicating that their movement was unnecessary for the moment, in what Velasco Hernández (2019) considers "a mistake." in bulk" given that that same day at night the corsair expedition had arrived near Cartagena.[8]​[92]​.

The Marquis of Vélez, named Luis Fajardo de la Cueva, was approximately 53 years old when he held the position of Major Advance and Captain General of the Kingdom of Murcia in the name of King Philip II in 1561, and was an aristocrat born in Murcia or Vélez-Blanco—Kingdom of Granada—, son of the also aristocrats Pedro Fajardo y Chacón, Marquis of Vélez, and Mencía de la Cueva and Toledo. Married to Leonor Fernández de Córdoba y Silva in 1526, Luis Fajardo was a veteran military man who during his youth had served in the wars of Charles V against the Ottomans in Hungary (1531), against the French in Provence (1536), and against the Turks and their Berber partners in Tunisia (1535) and Algiers (1541), being recognized for a bellicose personality that authors such as Cascales highlight. and Ginés Pérez de Hita.[1][8][105] Regarding the exercise of countermeasures against corsair raids, Fajardo had extensive experience that dated back to at least 1543, when he had served as advance lieutenant in the absence of his father in the Kingdom of Murcia. At that time, it had been known about the possible approach of the Ottoman army from the north after having intervened in the siege of Nice "Siege of Nice (1543)") in favor of its French allies and wintering in Toulon, which is why Luis Fajardo, invested with the authority delegated by the Marquis of the Vélez, toured the Murcian kingdom calling for levies in Lorca, Murcia and in his family manors, where he faced some resistance. in Mula. When the Turkish fleet finally appeared, in November, it was to disembark to slaughter some flocks that were grazing in the countryside of Mazarrón, being rejected by the Velezan lordly militias and the Lorca councillors, led, now, by the Marquis of Vélez in person.[106]​ Having inherited the marquisate - along with the associated responsibilities - upon the death of his father in 1546, the Marquis de lo Vélez's ability to inspire obedience was tested again in 1551, when rumors spread about the possible arrival of a large Turkish navy to the southeast of the peninsula. The then Prince Felipe then requested the Marquis of the Vélez to move his residence to Campo de Cartagena and warn the lordly and council militias of the Kingdom of Murcia. By September, 1,500 men had been gathered to garrison Cartagena, which, however, were mobilized in vain as it became clear that the alarm was unfounded, so that in November of that year the majority of the soldiers were discharged.[107] Finally, allusions of a laudatory nature are recorded to a combat that would have taken place in Portmán on an imprecise date, in which the marquis, accompanied by the leadership of his led by his half-brother Juan Fajardo de Silva and his son Diego Fajardo y Córdoba, would have repelled a privateer landing and inflicted heavy casualties on the adversary contingent, of which "more than fifty", supposedly, would have occurred at the hands of the marquis himself.[1][8]​.

opposing forces

Regarding the troops deployed by the Ottoman corsairs under the command of Uluj Ali, the existing documentation shows a substantial divergence both in the calculation of the number of troops and in their nature, just as happens with the ships. The chapter minutes of the Council of Cartagena examined by Montojo Montojo (1987) record a landing force composed of 1,800 soldiers, a figure that has been accepted as credible by that author and by Velasco Hernández (2019), who, recognizing that the contingent "was quite numerous", highlights the quantitative similarity with the cadres used in Sóller a week later, estimated by the Spanish sources between 1600 and 1700 men.[l]​[4]​[5]​[94]​[95]​[109]​ The alternative comes from the hand of Cascales and Pérez de Hita, who deviate from the proposed figure with "more than nine hundred" for the first and "more than two thousand" for the second.[1]​[8]​ The classification and origin of these soldiers thrown to the ground by Uluj Alí are also difficult. to ponder based on the available sources, given that the corsairs were a very heterogeneous group that included renegade European, Turkish, Moorish and Moorish elements.[28] The Cartagena capitular minutes describe the attacking force as composed of "Turkish marksmen, riflemen and archers", which, given that the word "Turk" was defined as any Muslim subject of the sultan Ottoman, it could be a characterization pars pro toto.[5]​[110]​ Velasco Hernández (2019) introduces a nuance by considering that these combatants must have been janissaries "for the most part."[100]​ Bover de Rosselló (1856) states the same thing when discussing the attack on Sóller, while the parish report published in 1888 refers to them undoubtedly as "janissaries and Turks."[94]​[108]​ The widespread presence of this elite unit in the crews of the Regency of Algiers was a certainly recent phenomenon, since at first they were vetoed by Jeireddín Barbarossa. This circumstance changed after a series of revolts between 1561 and 1568, when the janissaries began to be admitted by the arraeces on their ships and, in exchange, the renegades gained access to the Algerian militia.[111]​.

In the Spanish counterpart, the primary sources are even more sparse about the forces that the Marquis of Vélez had at the time of facing the corsairs, which must be distinguished from those that finally participated in the battle. The minutes of the Council of Cartagena briefly indicate that, when the time came, the marquis "went out with some people on horseback and on foot", since Cascales, somewhat more illustrative, states that "the marquis then left with his people, and those he could get out of Cartagena, leaving the city with a good guard." With this "people" of the marquis, reference is made to the militias from the manors that the House of Fajardo owned in the Kingdom of Murcia, which included the towns of Mula, Molina de Segura, Librilla and Alhama de Murcia. contemporaries to resort to the study of complementary documentation to indirectly reconstruct the military mobilization that had to be carried out. In this way, according to the data collected by Velasco Hernández (2019), the body of cavalry that attended the "rebatos" usually consisted of between fifty and one hundred horsemen, although it could be increased to over 150 with those from Lorca and Murcia - in the register of volunteer gentlemen with weapons from Murcia and Lorca carried out in 1598, those registered with horses and weapons were 106 in Murcia and 52 in Lorca. In that sense, Velasco Hernández concludes that around a hundred horse soldiers must have been present in Cartagena, since the Lorca units did not participate in the relief of Cartagena.[113] The council militias must have constituted the bulk of the defensive effort in the spring of 1561. In the case of the Murcian militia, Chacón Jiménez (1979) records a recruitment of more than 3,000 men, even though it had been carried out during the night and Murcia was at that time isolated by an overflowing of the Segura River. The author himself highlights it as significant "despite the hyperbolic", while Velasco Hernández judges it exaggerated and, relying on the capitular minutes of the Huertano council, suggests that the Murcian relief would have consisted rather of about 200 harquebusiers. 1,251 troops distributed in three companies.[6]​ The defense device was completed by the 20-25 soldiers of the permanent garrison of the castle of Concepción under the command of its warden and, in the case of being actually present—since it was usually activated at the end of spring—the temporary garrison with its 200-400 men.[114]​.

The battle

The historiographic understanding of the Battle of Santa Monica is based on four written sources, all of them individual accounts that respond to different interests:

• - Firstly, we would find the chapter minutes of the Council of Cartagena, documents of an administrative nature and internal use that record the deliberations and agreements of the municipal corporation, and where the details of the assault emerge reflected together with the provisions adopted on the occasion of it. Montojo Montojo (1987) was the first historian who offered an exhaustive narrative of the conflict based on these minutes, and it is on his interpretation that Velasco Hernández's (2019) analysis of the passage of the Uluj Alí expedition through Cartagena rests, which he accepts as reliable.[3]​[5]​.

• - The next resource, following a temporal order, is the Book of the population and exploits of the very noble and loyal city of Lorca, written by Ginés Pérez de Hita under commission from the Council of Lorca in 1572 but not published in its entirety until 1929.[115]​ Despite the fact that its song —«Of the battle that the Marquis of the Vélez had in Cartagena with the Moors of Africa»— offers the exhibition most detailed of the facts, its reliability as a source has been systematically questioned by historiography, considering that in this book Pérez de Hita does not aspire to historicity but to provide Lorca with his own epic inspired by the Trojan cycle, for which he resorts to a fabled story that contains "serious inaccuracies" and chivalric episodes with a factual background but "of a fictional nature inspired by legends local».[116]​[117]​[118]​.

• - The Book of Lorca, as it is commonly abbreviated, served as a draft for the magnum opus of Pérez de Hita: the History of the civil wars of Granada, in the second part of which, published in 1619, the battle of Santa Mónica appears referred to in a succinct introductory passage about the figure of the Marquis of the Vélez.[1]​[117]​ Although the first part, set in the struggles between Zegríes and Abencerrajes of the century, is configured as a historical novel, the second, set in the Alpujarras War of 1568-1571, can be considered more "a fictionalized story of medium quality" in the words of Bunes Ibarra (1983), in which Franco Llopis and Moreno Díaz del Campo (2019) appreciate that "the literary artifice is replaced by a greater concern when narrating the events and in which there is less concession to fantasy."[119]​[120]​ However, Carrasco Urgoiti (1981) points out the lack of objectivity of Pérez de Hita when he describes the actions of the Marquis of the Vélez: "It is evident that for Pérez de Hita the stately prestige of the great Andalusian houses has not been extinguished, but only when he has a personal relationship with them is he interested in exalting their exploits. This occurs to an eminent degree when it deals with the Marquis of Vélez, Don Luis Fajardo, under whose flags the author served and in whose manor lands he spent part of his life. The exaltation that it is the object of in the book should be attributed, more than to historical facts, to such circumstance and personal knowledge.

Resumption of the corsair expedition

The frustrated assault on Cartagena had consequences that were immediately felt, both in the reinforcement of the urban defenses and in the itinerary of the privateer fleet. In the city, authorities implemented a series of urgent measures aimed at preventing new attacks. Thus, it was arranged that two pairs of horse guards would tour the walls every night and inspect the "coast guards." The Puerta de San Ginés was narrowed so that only one rider could pass through at a time, and a sentry box with capacity for four or six soldiers was erected above it. In addition, the blocking of the Puerta del Mar, located in the Arenal area, was ordered, along with the houses that faced the Plaza de la Pescadería. The Murcia council militia received instructions to remain in Cartagena until the definitive departure of the corsair expedition was confirmed. Finally, the obligation was established for all residents to spend the night within the walled enclosure, without leaving it until dawn and in broad daylight, with failure to comply with this rule being punished with six days in prison and a fine of one hundred maravedis.[129]​.

For its part, Uluj Alí's squadron landed on Grosa Island, both to give its crew a rest after having hastily set sail from the Algamecas and to stalk potential prey. Although there is no evidence of the corsairs' subsequent crossing of the Alicante coast, it is likely that they tried to plunder some other coastal enclave. On the other hand, the incursion of Sóller —Mallorca— on May 11, 1561, just a week after the failed attempt on Cartagena, is documented. As was usual in Barbary expeditions, Uluj Alí had first looked for a point to supply himself with drinking water, finding it on the island of Ibiza. However, this stopover revealed their presence to the warning system of the Kingdom of Mallorca, which allowed Lieutenant General Guillem de Rocafull to alert the captain of Sóller, Joan Angelats, and the neighboring towns of Buñola, Santa María del Camino and Alaró, which he urged to prepare to provide aid. Despite the precautions, the Algiers Regency squadron managed to anchor in a nearby cove and disembark around 1,600 troops without the "coast guards" detecting it. The invading forces were divided into two columns: one advanced directly towards the port, while the other made a detour and attacked Sóller from the north, obtaining considerable loot. The Sollerico militiamen, who had initially concentrated in the port, found themselves cornered between both corsair contingents, so they decided to launch a counterattack on the group that occupied the port and, after recovering it, they awaited the return of the second party, which returned loaded with the proceeds of the looting and numerous captives, mostly women and children. Seeing themselves pursued, the assailants fled towards the cliffs, where they abandoned part of what they had stolen and executed many prisoners before managing to reembark.[130]​.

This constituted Uluj Ali's last campaign against the Spanish coasts. After the new disaster in Sóller, his fleet headed towards Algiers, where in September 1561 a period of political interim was inaugurated, sparked by the dismissal and transfer of Hasan Pasha to Constantinople to stand trial. During this interregnum, the government of the Regency fell successively to four provisional beylerbeys - Hassan Agha, Cuça Mohammed, Ahmed Pasha and Yahia - whose administrations lasted barely a year, until the return of Barbarossa's son in September 1562, once exonerated from the accusations. That same year, the Ottoman Sultan Selim II summoned Uluj Ali to the imperial capital and entrusted him with command of the Alexandria Guard, a position that accredited him as de facto vice admiral of the Ottoman navy, subordinate to Piali Pasha. In 1565 he intervened in the ill-fated siege of Malta "Siege of Malta (1565)"), where his friend Dragut perished, although this setback did not cut short his career: in 1566 he personally commanded the Ottoman naval forces in a raid through the Tyrrhenian Sea, devastating several towns in Corsica and Sardinia.[131]

In 1568, Uluj Ali assumed the beylerbeyato of Algiers, beginning a mandate marked by two events: the second rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568-1571) and the preparations for the overthrow of the Hafsi dynasty in Tunisia. During the Granada conflict, he authorized privateers—mostly Moorish in origin—to join the insurrection, to which he also provided logistical support. However, its main strategic ambition focused on the weakened Hafsi sultanate of Abu al-Abbas Ahmad III, whose vassalage to the Spanish Monarchy had undermined its legitimacy among its Muslim subjects. Through a combined offensive by sea and land, backed by the surrounding Kabyles, Uluj Ali conquered Tunisia in January 1569, proclaiming himself bey of the city and unifying the two main regencies of the Maghreb under his aegis, a feat that only Jeireddin Barbarossa had previously accomplished. In 1571, the sultan claimed him to participate in the great expedition against the Holy League "Holy League (1571)") that led to the battle of Lepanto. Despite the Ottoman defeat against the forces of John of Austria, the privateer managed to save thirty ships and return to Constantinople, where he was received with honors and invested as commander of the Ottoman navy in the process of reconstruction, with which he would carry out raids in 1572 and 1573. That last year, the victor of Lepanto recovered Tunisia "Conquest of Tunisia (1573)") for Spain, causing a Uluj Ali's swift reaction: at the head of more than 250 galleys, he reconquered "Conquest of Tunis (1574)") both the city and its port of La Goleta in the summer of 1574. Between 1575 and 1577 he established himself in Constantinople, away from significant war actions, but in 1578 he set out to sea with 50 galleys to quell a revolt in Cyprus. The following year he was assigned to the Black Sea as part of the war effort against the Safavid Persians, in what would be his last relevant mission in the service of the sultan. At more than seventy years old, he retired from active life and died in 1587.[132]​.

Consolidation of Cartagena as a stronghold

The attempt of 1561 made Cartagena's defensive vulnerabilities evident and left a lasting mark on the collective consciousness of its citizens, generating an environment of insecurity that lasted for years. In the following months, any rumor about a possible return of the privateer fleet was enough to induce the exodus of entire families along with their most precious assets. At the end of May, the false news that the Ottoman and Algerian squads were preparing a new assault against Cartagena caused panic and triggered a mass flight, forcing the Council to act:[133]​.

Three years later, in 1564, the council minutes continued to include references to the frustrated landing, among them the conviction among the councilors that its primary objective would have been the looting of the San Roque suburb.[129] The Turkish-Berberian pressure remained constant throughout the decade: in 1562 forty ships were seen - far exceeding the force of the previous year - prowling the port, while in Mazarrón intercepted a spy sent to find out how many galleys were anchored in Cartagena; and the naval harassment would continue, to a lesser extent, in 1563, 1565, 1566 and 1567. The Cartagena defense device even received a setback in 1573, when the mayor Pedro Monreal was ambushed and captured while practicing a "ride" in La Manga del Mar Menor against the corsairs, who obtained 1000 ducats "Ducado (currency)") for their rescue.[134]​.

The attack of 1561 highlighted that, although Cartagena within the walls enjoyed relative security, its periphery continued to require urgent improvements.[135] The suburb of San Roque, lacking wall protection and crowded with flimsy and low-rise homes, was identified as a critical point because it made it easier to overcome the walls in the Puerta de Murcia sector. The Council decreed its abandonment during the first years of the decade 1561-1570, but it continued to be inhabited and received new grants of licenses to build on plots between 1567 and 1591, coinciding with the period of demographic growth that would lead the city to reach 9,500 inhabitants in 1600.[81]​[129]​[136]​ The second rebellion of the Alpujarras provided the definitive stimulus for a fortification program more ambitious than all the previous ones. In the spring of 1570, Philip II sent the military engineers Vespasiano Gonzaga and Juan Bautista Antonelli to Cartagena to direct the modernization of the defensive framework, a project that this time had significant financing and manpower. the reinforcement of the gates of San Ginés and the Dock, as well as the construction of a new fence that complemented the wall of the Dean. Towards mid-1571 the works were practically completed, at which time Cartagena was considered fully fortified.[138]​[139]​ The notable improvement in the defenses was reflected in the words that Leonardo Donato addressed to the Venetian Senate, at the end of his term as ambassador of the Republic of Venice in Spain (1573):

Rebalance of powers and decline of the "great galley war"

At the beginning of the 1560s, the Hispanic Monarchy faced a period of naval reconstruction and gradual restoration of its warlike capacity in the Mediterranean, which was not cut short even by disasters such as the Los Gelves expedition (1560) or the multiple shipwreck of La Herradura (1562). In 1563, the Beylerbey of Algiers, Hasan Pasha, mobilized the resources of the Regency to undertake the conquest of the square of Oran, but had to lift the siege due to the arrival of a relief force composed of ships from Genoa, Spain and Naples under the command of Andrea Doria, and whose preparations in Cartagena had been assisted by Luis Fajardo, Marquis of the Vélez.[8]​[150]​ The process of Spanish maritime recovery continued to bear fruit with the reconquest of the rock of Vélez de la Gomera in 1564 and with the transcendental intervention in the relief of Malta in 1565, actions that preluded the victory of the Holy League in Lepanto, in 1571.[150]​[151]​.

The outbreak of the second rebellion of the Alpujarras in 1568 represented a parenthesis in this impulse, by modifying the military priorities of the Monarchy and forcing it to divert a large part of its naval resources to guard the coasts of the Kingdom of Granada, to prevent Turkish-Berber support. This strategic reorientation implied the neglect of other fronts and facilitated the fall of Tunisia into Ottoman hands in 1569.[151] For their part, the rebellious Moriscos were unable to capture any port that would allow them to receive foreign aid on a sustained basis, although they besieged several cities on the Almeria coast for that purpose. The first effective response of the Monarchy came from the Marquis of the Vélez, who gathered a contingent of 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from the militias of Lorca, Murcia and Cartagena to assist the governor of Almería, García de Villarroel, against the insurgent threat. However, the marquis' campaign was hindered by desertions and violent looting committed by his insubordinate troops, to the point of suffering a personal attack when he tried to reestablish discipline. Finally, Governor García de Villarroel was able to see the pressure on his city relieved thanks to the approach of the Murcian army and the sending, in January 1569, of six frigates loaded with men and supplies from Cartagena, which committed so many troops to land and naval relief that it was practically unguarded, requiring Murcia to send 266 men to ensure its own defense.[152]​.

That same month, the episode known as the "Inox business" took place, in which the Almeria militias and the crews of the Cartagena ships captained by Gil de Andrada captured more than 3,000 Moriscos on the rock of Inox who were awaiting transport to Barbary by corsairs, being reduced to slavery; Of them, 333 women and girls were destined as loot to Cartagena. The limited progress obtained by the campaigns of the Marquises of Vélez and Mondéjar aroused the dissatisfaction of Philip II, which motivated the appointment of his half-brother, Juan de Austria, as captain general of Granada.[153]​ Fajardo thus ended, demoted in the chain of command, his last service to the Crown, before dying at nearly 66 years of age in 1574.[105]​ Meanwhile, Granadan emissaries had tried to persuade Uluj Ali to take an active part in the uprising, assuring him that, after the Moorish uprising, those of Aragon and Valencia would follow, and that they would give him the port of Cartagena as the nerve center for an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. The Beylerbey chose, however, to focus his efforts on Hafsi Tunisia, although in January 1569 six Algerian galley slaves landed artillery, ammunition and reinforcements near Almería, in contrast to the inability of the Ottoman navy, which was engaged in the "Turkish-Venetian War (1570-1573)" conquest of Venetian Cyprus. In Spain, Philip II ordered Gil de Andrada to patrol the coast and requested naval support from Genoa, Naples and Sicily, which resulted in the interception of numerous privateer ships, although by the spring of 1570 it was estimated that there were some 4,000 Turkish and Berber volunteers fighting in the Alpujarras. Given the intensification of hostilities, the Cartagena militias were mobilized repeatedly to continue integrating into the forces in charge of quelling the rebellion.[154]​.

The Uluj Alí expedition and the preparations of the Marquis of the Vélez

The corsair expedition against the Spanish Levant in the spring of 1561 is an event for which a partial historical record is managed, since the sources analyzed by historiography exclusively reflect the Spanish perspective. Unlike the raid carried out by Dragut in 1550, this episode also lacks a comprehensive narrative, resulting in a fragmentary knowledge of it that prevents specifying aspects such as the exact date of departure from Algiers, the moment of arrival in the Iberian southeast or details about its journey along the Alicante coast. Despite this, the comparison with the usual patterns of privateer campaigns allows us to plausibly reconstruct its stages and characteristics. By 1561, the Regency of Algiers was once again governed by Hasan Pasha, son of Barbarossa, who had held the title of beylerbey since June 1557, after the death of his predecessor Salah Reis during the plague epidemic that had devastated Algiers since June 1556. Given that in the period 1561-1564 the Ottoman navy barely left port, the organization of this The raid exemplifies the wide degree of autonomy that the Algerian sailors enjoyed with respect to Sultan Suleiman.[85]​ The most favorable time for an expedition was the period between late spring and early autumn, taking advantage of the favorable weather conditions and reserving the rest of the year to winter the ships and commission maintenance work by caulkers and shore carpenters—mostly Christian slaves—along with specialized Moorish workers.[86]​ The The main objective of the company was to capture any ships that accidentally crossed paths and carry out raids on inhabited areas near the coast to capture the largest possible number of Christians and supply with them the lucrative slave market of Algiers, without ruling out the looting of urban centers or the evacuation of Moors.[87] As for the theater of operations, it was divided into two areas: "Western", which included the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands; and "Levante", which corresponded to Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and the coasts of the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas. During the beginning of the war season, almost all of the 12,000 soldiers in the Algiers garrison embarked, leaving only a small detachment on guard.[88]

In 1561, the expedition to "Western" fell under the direction of the arraeces Uluj Alí and Yusuf Rais,[j]​ the latter a figure practically unknown outside of the chronicles related to this campaign.[3]​ Uluj Alí, baptized as Giovanni Dionigi Galeni, was approximately 41 years old and was a renegade of Italian origin born in Calabria—Kingdom of Naples—, in The bosom of a Christian family made up of his father, the fisherman Birno Galeni, and his mother Pippa de Cicco. and changing his name to Uluj Alí - "Alí the Renegade". Over time, he managed to acquire a stake in a privateer brig, the performance of which brought him significant financial benefits. He was thus able to climb socially in Algiers, marry the daughter of his former master and obtain a marquee license, and since then he has carried out successful attacks on the Italian coast, in which his new name was phonetically deformed to "Occhiali". during the decades of 1540 and 1550. In 1560 he placed himself under the orders of Piali Pasha in the destruction of the Christian navy that had threatened Dragut, and the following year, while his partner counterattacked with a campaign against "Levant" in which he would subject the port of Naples to a naval blockade "Blockade (strategy)"), Uluj Ali would launch an attack towards "Western".[91]

The number of ships that made up the corsair squadron is a cause of dissension among the sources, because although the original notice from Oran numbered 44 ships of the expedition, the chapter minutes of the councils of Lorca - based on reports from the Council of Mojácar - and Cartagena, written during the occurrence of the expedition or in the days immediately following, include statements in which 26 ships are listed, the preferred figure. by Montojo Montojo (1987) and Velasco Hernández (2019).[5]​[92]​ Further numerically and temporally is the scholar Francisco Cascales, who raised the number of Uluj Alí vessels to 36 in 1621.[8]​ The majority of preserved records do not specify the type of ship used by the corsairs, with the exception of those related to the final sacking of Sóller: in that sense, Joan Binimelis in his account of 1595 and the anonymous parish report published in 1888 coincide in stating that they were mostly galley boats accompanied by some galleys, in contrast to Vicente Mut, who describes "galleys and other rowing vessels" in his chronicle of 1650. Christian use, its design sacrificed size and tonnage by virtue of greater speed, making it ideal for quick surprise attack and subsequent escape with the least possible risk. Their artillery was reduced to a larger piece in the bay "Crujía (nautical)") and two others on its sides, in addition to some grinders "Emeril (artillery)") on the sides, and its lightness was enhanced by the fact that only what was strictly necessary was carried on board: provisions, liquid, weapons and ammunition - which is why they needed to frequently make water. The average crew of a twenty-bank galley boat could amount to about 160 men or more, half of them rowers and the other half soldiers and sailors.[96]​.

The usual route of the Barbary expeditions included, once they set sail from Algiers, stopovers in Cherchell, the Habibas Islands or the Chafarinas before crossing to the Iberian Peninsula. Velasco Hernández (2019) assumes that Uluj Alí must have passed through the area of Cabo de Gata in the last days of April, linking it with an incursion documented by Cabrillana Ciézar (1982) on the field of Níjar on those same dates. on the way, to then go to attack a town in the Balearic Islands. It was common for them to look for a sheltered spot where they could be safe from winds and storms and from where they could wait in ambush for the transit of a merchant ship, including the Gata and Cope capes, the port of Portmán or the Grosa and Tabarca islands.[99] Generally, these campaigns rarely exceeded 50 or 60 days, a limit imposed by supplies, and they did not go more than five or six miles inland to avoid the risk of being intercepted by reinforcements from the interior and, above all, facing cavalry.[100] Military intelligence was a key resource for the Algerian arraeces: they knew of the importance of Cartagena as one of the main anchorages of the Spanish Navy, and therefore it was common for them to send spies to ensure the whereabouts of their galleys. Dragut had sent several spies before his attempted landing in 1550, and everything indicates that this practice was also resorted to in 1561.[101] In fact, in 1560 a spy had been captured in Mazarrón with instructions to reach Cartagena and investigate the presence and number of galleys.[102] This was not the only method of obtaining strategic information, however, since the privateers often interrogated the captains of ships from Cartagena that they captured at sea, and there was news that some renegade from Cartagena had come to offer to guide the corsairs in a raid against Mazarrón or the suburb of San Roque, in Cartagena.[103]​.

Counteracting these tactics was precisely the purpose of the firmly established Spanish warning system: the "double presidio" of Oran and Mazalquivir quickly dispatched a brig with the warning to Cartagena as soon as enemy squadrons were sighted, and from there the news spread by land to the coastal towns to the north and south of the city.[104] This happened in the spring of 1561, when thanks to the timely warning from Oran the leaders of the Kingdom of Murcia learned two weeks in advance that a Turkish-Berber fleet had headed towards the Spanish coast. The following movements of the expedition are known thanks to the minutes of the Council of Lorca, which record the receipt of several letters related to it. In the first, on April 24, the Marquis de los Vélez reported the sighting of the Algerian fleet near Oran, "and because they could soon do damage in the city of Cartagena and throughout this coast, [in] especially in the area of ​​Maçarrón, there was no help that could resist it," he ordered the militia to be prepared to leave. On the 30th of the same month, a letter from the Mojácar Council, dated the previous day, warned of the presence of 26 privateer ships in its waters, and therefore begged Lorca for help from 40-50 harquebusiers. It is this letter that allows Velasco Hernández (2019) to conjecture that the expedition had passed Cabo de Gata shortly before that date. On May 2, a new letter from the Marquis of Vélez orders Lorca to send a troop of 200 infantry and 30 cavalry to Mazarrón — where he himself was located — but the next day, when the army was about to march, a final letter was received from the Marquis annulling the previous order, indicating that their movement was unnecessary for the moment, in what Velasco Hernández (2019) considers "a mistake." in bulk" given that that same day at night the corsair expedition had arrived near Cartagena.[8]​[92]​.

The Marquis of Vélez, named Luis Fajardo de la Cueva, was approximately 53 years old when he held the position of Major Advance and Captain General of the Kingdom of Murcia in the name of King Philip II in 1561, and was an aristocrat born in Murcia or Vélez-Blanco—Kingdom of Granada—, son of the also aristocrats Pedro Fajardo y Chacón, Marquis of Vélez, and Mencía de la Cueva and Toledo. Married to Leonor Fernández de Córdoba y Silva in 1526, Luis Fajardo was a veteran military man who during his youth had served in the wars of Charles V against the Ottomans in Hungary (1531), against the French in Provence (1536), and against the Turks and their Berber partners in Tunisia (1535) and Algiers (1541), being recognized for a bellicose personality that authors such as Cascales highlight. and Ginés Pérez de Hita.[1][8][105] Regarding the exercise of countermeasures against corsair raids, Fajardo had extensive experience that dated back to at least 1543, when he had served as advance lieutenant in the absence of his father in the Kingdom of Murcia. At that time, it had been known about the possible approach of the Ottoman army from the north after having intervened in the siege of Nice "Siege of Nice (1543)") in favor of its French allies and wintering in Toulon, which is why Luis Fajardo, invested with the authority delegated by the Marquis of the Vélez, toured the Murcian kingdom calling for levies in Lorca, Murcia and in his family manors, where he faced some resistance. in Mula. When the Turkish fleet finally appeared, in November, it was to disembark to slaughter some flocks that were grazing in the countryside of Mazarrón, being rejected by the Velezan lordly militias and the Lorca councillors, led, now, by the Marquis of Vélez in person.[106]​ Having inherited the marquisate - along with the associated responsibilities - upon the death of his father in 1546, the Marquis de lo Vélez's ability to inspire obedience was tested again in 1551, when rumors spread about the possible arrival of a large Turkish navy to the southeast of the peninsula. The then Prince Felipe then requested the Marquis of the Vélez to move his residence to Campo de Cartagena and warn the lordly and council militias of the Kingdom of Murcia. By September, 1,500 men had been gathered to garrison Cartagena, which, however, were mobilized in vain as it became clear that the alarm was unfounded, so that in November of that year the majority of the soldiers were discharged.[107] Finally, allusions of a laudatory nature are recorded to a combat that would have taken place in Portmán on an imprecise date, in which the marquis, accompanied by the leadership of his led by his half-brother Juan Fajardo de Silva and his son Diego Fajardo y Córdoba, would have repelled a privateer landing and inflicted heavy casualties on the adversary contingent, of which "more than fifty", supposedly, would have occurred at the hands of the marquis himself.[1][8]​.

opposing forces

Regarding the troops deployed by the Ottoman corsairs under the command of Uluj Ali, the existing documentation shows a substantial divergence both in the calculation of the number of troops and in their nature, just as happens with the ships. The chapter minutes of the Council of Cartagena examined by Montojo Montojo (1987) record a landing force composed of 1,800 soldiers, a figure that has been accepted as credible by that author and by Velasco Hernández (2019), who, recognizing that the contingent "was quite numerous", highlights the quantitative similarity with the cadres used in Sóller a week later, estimated by the Spanish sources between 1600 and 1700 men.[l]​[4]​[5]​[94]​[95]​[109]​ The alternative comes from the hand of Cascales and Pérez de Hita, who deviate from the proposed figure with "more than nine hundred" for the first and "more than two thousand" for the second.[1]​[8]​ The classification and origin of these soldiers thrown to the ground by Uluj Alí are also difficult. to ponder based on the available sources, given that the corsairs were a very heterogeneous group that included renegade European, Turkish, Moorish and Moorish elements.[28] The Cartagena capitular minutes describe the attacking force as composed of "Turkish marksmen, riflemen and archers", which, given that the word "Turk" was defined as any Muslim subject of the sultan Ottoman, it could be a characterization pars pro toto.[5]​[110]​ Velasco Hernández (2019) introduces a nuance by considering that these combatants must have been janissaries "for the most part."[100]​ Bover de Rosselló (1856) states the same thing when discussing the attack on Sóller, while the parish report published in 1888 refers to them undoubtedly as "janissaries and Turks."[94]​[108]​ The widespread presence of this elite unit in the crews of the Regency of Algiers was a certainly recent phenomenon, since at first they were vetoed by Jeireddín Barbarossa. This circumstance changed after a series of revolts between 1561 and 1568, when the janissaries began to be admitted by the arraeces on their ships and, in exchange, the renegades gained access to the Algerian militia.[111]​.

In the Spanish counterpart, the primary sources are even more sparse about the forces that the Marquis of Vélez had at the time of facing the corsairs, which must be distinguished from those that finally participated in the battle. The minutes of the Council of Cartagena briefly indicate that, when the time came, the marquis "went out with some people on horseback and on foot", since Cascales, somewhat more illustrative, states that "the marquis then left with his people, and those he could get out of Cartagena, leaving the city with a good guard." With this "people" of the marquis, reference is made to the militias from the manors that the House of Fajardo owned in the Kingdom of Murcia, which included the towns of Mula, Molina de Segura, Librilla and Alhama de Murcia. contemporaries to resort to the study of complementary documentation to indirectly reconstruct the military mobilization that had to be carried out. In this way, according to the data collected by Velasco Hernández (2019), the body of cavalry that attended the "rebatos" usually consisted of between fifty and one hundred horsemen, although it could be increased to over 150 with those from Lorca and Murcia - in the register of volunteer gentlemen with weapons from Murcia and Lorca carried out in 1598, those registered with horses and weapons were 106 in Murcia and 52 in Lorca. In that sense, Velasco Hernández concludes that around a hundred horse soldiers must have been present in Cartagena, since the Lorca units did not participate in the relief of Cartagena.[113] The council militias must have constituted the bulk of the defensive effort in the spring of 1561. In the case of the Murcian militia, Chacón Jiménez (1979) records a recruitment of more than 3,000 men, even though it had been carried out during the night and Murcia was at that time isolated by an overflowing of the Segura River. The author himself highlights it as significant "despite the hyperbolic", while Velasco Hernández judges it exaggerated and, relying on the capitular minutes of the Huertano council, suggests that the Murcian relief would have consisted rather of about 200 harquebusiers. 1,251 troops distributed in three companies.[6]​ The defense device was completed by the 20-25 soldiers of the permanent garrison of the castle of Concepción under the command of its warden and, in the case of being actually present—since it was usually activated at the end of spring—the temporary garrison with its 200-400 men.[114]​.

The battle

The historiographic understanding of the Battle of Santa Monica is based on four written sources, all of them individual accounts that respond to different interests:

• - Firstly, we would find the chapter minutes of the Council of Cartagena, documents of an administrative nature and internal use that record the deliberations and agreements of the municipal corporation, and where the details of the assault emerge reflected together with the provisions adopted on the occasion of it. Montojo Montojo (1987) was the first historian who offered an exhaustive narrative of the conflict based on these minutes, and it is on his interpretation that Velasco Hernández's (2019) analysis of the passage of the Uluj Alí expedition through Cartagena rests, which he accepts as reliable.[3]​[5]​.

• - The next resource, following a temporal order, is the Book of the population and exploits of the very noble and loyal city of Lorca, written by Ginés Pérez de Hita under commission from the Council of Lorca in 1572 but not published in its entirety until 1929.[115]​ Despite the fact that its song —«Of the battle that the Marquis of the Vélez had in Cartagena with the Moors of Africa»— offers the exhibition most detailed of the facts, its reliability as a source has been systematically questioned by historiography, considering that in this book Pérez de Hita does not aspire to historicity but to provide Lorca with his own epic inspired by the Trojan cycle, for which he resorts to a fabled story that contains "serious inaccuracies" and chivalric episodes with a factual background but "of a fictional nature inspired by legends local».[116]​[117]​[118]​.

• - The Book of Lorca, as it is commonly abbreviated, served as a draft for the magnum opus of Pérez de Hita: the History of the civil wars of Granada, in the second part of which, published in 1619, the battle of Santa Mónica appears referred to in a succinct introductory passage about the figure of the Marquis of the Vélez.[1]​[117]​ Although the first part, set in the struggles between Zegríes and Abencerrajes of the century, is configured as a historical novel, the second, set in the Alpujarras War of 1568-1571, can be considered more "a fictionalized story of medium quality" in the words of Bunes Ibarra (1983), in which Franco Llopis and Moreno Díaz del Campo (2019) appreciate that "the literary artifice is replaced by a greater concern when narrating the events and in which there is less concession to fantasy."[119]​[120]​ However, Carrasco Urgoiti (1981) points out the lack of objectivity of Pérez de Hita when he describes the actions of the Marquis of the Vélez: "It is evident that for Pérez de Hita the stately prestige of the great Andalusian houses has not been extinguished, but only when he has a personal relationship with them is he interested in exalting their exploits. This occurs to an eminent degree when it deals with the Marquis of Vélez, Don Luis Fajardo, under whose flags the author served and in whose manor lands he spent part of his life. The exaltation that it is the object of in the book should be attributed, more than to historical facts, to such circumstance and personal knowledge.

Resumption of the corsair expedition

The frustrated assault on Cartagena had consequences that were immediately felt, both in the reinforcement of the urban defenses and in the itinerary of the privateer fleet. In the city, authorities implemented a series of urgent measures aimed at preventing new attacks. Thus, it was arranged that two pairs of horse guards would tour the walls every night and inspect the "coast guards." The Puerta de San Ginés was narrowed so that only one rider could pass through at a time, and a sentry box with capacity for four or six soldiers was erected above it. In addition, the blocking of the Puerta del Mar, located in the Arenal area, was ordered, along with the houses that faced the Plaza de la Pescadería. The Murcia council militia received instructions to remain in Cartagena until the definitive departure of the corsair expedition was confirmed. Finally, the obligation was established for all residents to spend the night within the walled enclosure, without leaving it until dawn and in broad daylight, with failure to comply with this rule being punished with six days in prison and a fine of one hundred maravedis.[129]​.

For its part, Uluj Alí's squadron landed on Grosa Island, both to give its crew a rest after having hastily set sail from the Algamecas and to stalk potential prey. Although there is no evidence of the corsairs' subsequent crossing of the Alicante coast, it is likely that they tried to plunder some other coastal enclave. On the other hand, the incursion of Sóller —Mallorca— on May 11, 1561, just a week after the failed attempt on Cartagena, is documented. As was usual in Barbary expeditions, Uluj Alí had first looked for a point to supply himself with drinking water, finding it on the island of Ibiza. However, this stopover revealed their presence to the warning system of the Kingdom of Mallorca, which allowed Lieutenant General Guillem de Rocafull to alert the captain of Sóller, Joan Angelats, and the neighboring towns of Buñola, Santa María del Camino and Alaró, which he urged to prepare to provide aid. Despite the precautions, the Algiers Regency squadron managed to anchor in a nearby cove and disembark around 1,600 troops without the "coast guards" detecting it. The invading forces were divided into two columns: one advanced directly towards the port, while the other made a detour and attacked Sóller from the north, obtaining considerable loot. The Sollerico militiamen, who had initially concentrated in the port, found themselves cornered between both corsair contingents, so they decided to launch a counterattack on the group that occupied the port and, after recovering it, they awaited the return of the second party, which returned loaded with the proceeds of the looting and numerous captives, mostly women and children. Seeing themselves pursued, the assailants fled towards the cliffs, where they abandoned part of what they had stolen and executed many prisoners before managing to reembark.[130]​.

This constituted Uluj Ali's last campaign against the Spanish coasts. After the new disaster in Sóller, his fleet headed towards Algiers, where in September 1561 a period of political interim was inaugurated, sparked by the dismissal and transfer of Hasan Pasha to Constantinople to stand trial. During this interregnum, the government of the Regency fell successively to four provisional beylerbeys - Hassan Agha, Cuça Mohammed, Ahmed Pasha and Yahia - whose administrations lasted barely a year, until the return of Barbarossa's son in September 1562, once exonerated from the accusations. That same year, the Ottoman Sultan Selim II summoned Uluj Ali to the imperial capital and entrusted him with command of the Alexandria Guard, a position that accredited him as de facto vice admiral of the Ottoman navy, subordinate to Piali Pasha. In 1565 he intervened in the ill-fated siege of Malta "Siege of Malta (1565)"), where his friend Dragut perished, although this setback did not cut short his career: in 1566 he personally commanded the Ottoman naval forces in a raid through the Tyrrhenian Sea, devastating several towns in Corsica and Sardinia.[131]

In 1568, Uluj Ali assumed the beylerbeyato of Algiers, beginning a mandate marked by two events: the second rebellion of the Alpujarras (1568-1571) and the preparations for the overthrow of the Hafsi dynasty in Tunisia. During the Granada conflict, he authorized privateers—mostly Moorish in origin—to join the insurrection, to which he also provided logistical support. However, its main strategic ambition focused on the weakened Hafsi sultanate of Abu al-Abbas Ahmad III, whose vassalage to the Spanish Monarchy had undermined its legitimacy among its Muslim subjects. Through a combined offensive by sea and land, backed by the surrounding Kabyles, Uluj Ali conquered Tunisia in January 1569, proclaiming himself bey of the city and unifying the two main regencies of the Maghreb under his aegis, a feat that only Jeireddin Barbarossa had previously accomplished. In 1571, the sultan claimed him to participate in the great expedition against the Holy League "Holy League (1571)") that led to the battle of Lepanto. Despite the Ottoman defeat against the forces of John of Austria, the privateer managed to save thirty ships and return to Constantinople, where he was received with honors and invested as commander of the Ottoman navy in the process of reconstruction, with which he would carry out raids in 1572 and 1573. That last year, the victor of Lepanto recovered Tunisia "Conquest of Tunisia (1573)") for Spain, causing a Uluj Ali's swift reaction: at the head of more than 250 galleys, he reconquered "Conquest of Tunis (1574)") both the city and its port of La Goleta in the summer of 1574. Between 1575 and 1577 he established himself in Constantinople, away from significant war actions, but in 1578 he set out to sea with 50 galleys to quell a revolt in Cyprus. The following year he was assigned to the Black Sea as part of the war effort against the Safavid Persians, in what would be his last relevant mission in the service of the sultan. At more than seventy years old, he retired from active life and died in 1587.[132]​.

Consolidation of Cartagena as a stronghold

The attempt of 1561 made Cartagena's defensive vulnerabilities evident and left a lasting mark on the collective consciousness of its citizens, generating an environment of insecurity that lasted for years. In the following months, any rumor about a possible return of the privateer fleet was enough to induce the exodus of entire families along with their most precious assets. At the end of May, the false news that the Ottoman and Algerian squads were preparing a new assault against Cartagena caused panic and triggered a mass flight, forcing the Council to act:[133]​.

Three years later, in 1564, the council minutes continued to include references to the frustrated landing, among them the conviction among the councilors that its primary objective would have been the looting of the San Roque suburb.[129] The Turkish-Berberian pressure remained constant throughout the decade: in 1562 forty ships were seen - far exceeding the force of the previous year - prowling the port, while in Mazarrón intercepted a spy sent to find out how many galleys were anchored in Cartagena; and the naval harassment would continue, to a lesser extent, in 1563, 1565, 1566 and 1567. The Cartagena defense device even received a setback in 1573, when the mayor Pedro Monreal was ambushed and captured while practicing a "ride" in La Manga del Mar Menor against the corsairs, who obtained 1000 ducats "Ducado (currency)") for their rescue.[134]​.

The attack of 1561 highlighted that, although Cartagena within the walls enjoyed relative security, its periphery continued to require urgent improvements.[135] The suburb of San Roque, lacking wall protection and crowded with flimsy and low-rise homes, was identified as a critical point because it made it easier to overcome the walls in the Puerta de Murcia sector. The Council decreed its abandonment during the first years of the decade 1561-1570, but it continued to be inhabited and received new grants of licenses to build on plots between 1567 and 1591, coinciding with the period of demographic growth that would lead the city to reach 9,500 inhabitants in 1600.[81]​[129]​[136]​ The second rebellion of the Alpujarras provided the definitive stimulus for a fortification program more ambitious than all the previous ones. In the spring of 1570, Philip II sent the military engineers Vespasiano Gonzaga and Juan Bautista Antonelli to Cartagena to direct the modernization of the defensive framework, a project that this time had significant financing and manpower. the reinforcement of the gates of San Ginés and the Dock, as well as the construction of a new fence that complemented the wall of the Dean. Towards mid-1571 the works were practically completed, at which time Cartagena was considered fully fortified.[138]​[139]​ The notable improvement in the defenses was reflected in the words that Leonardo Donato addressed to the Venetian Senate, at the end of his term as ambassador of the Republic of Venice in Spain (1573):

Rebalance of powers and decline of the "great galley war"

At the beginning of the 1560s, the Hispanic Monarchy faced a period of naval reconstruction and gradual restoration of its warlike capacity in the Mediterranean, which was not cut short even by disasters such as the Los Gelves expedition (1560) or the multiple shipwreck of La Herradura (1562). In 1563, the Beylerbey of Algiers, Hasan Pasha, mobilized the resources of the Regency to undertake the conquest of the square of Oran, but had to lift the siege due to the arrival of a relief force composed of ships from Genoa, Spain and Naples under the command of Andrea Doria, and whose preparations in Cartagena had been assisted by Luis Fajardo, Marquis of the Vélez.[8]​[150]​ The process of Spanish maritime recovery continued to bear fruit with the reconquest of the rock of Vélez de la Gomera in 1564 and with the transcendental intervention in the relief of Malta in 1565, actions that preluded the victory of the Holy League in Lepanto, in 1571.[150]​[151]​.

The outbreak of the second rebellion of the Alpujarras in 1568 represented a parenthesis in this impulse, by modifying the military priorities of the Monarchy and forcing it to divert a large part of its naval resources to guard the coasts of the Kingdom of Granada, to prevent Turkish-Berber support. This strategic reorientation implied the neglect of other fronts and facilitated the fall of Tunisia into Ottoman hands in 1569.[151] For their part, the rebellious Moriscos were unable to capture any port that would allow them to receive foreign aid on a sustained basis, although they besieged several cities on the Almeria coast for that purpose. The first effective response of the Monarchy came from the Marquis of the Vélez, who gathered a contingent of 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from the militias of Lorca, Murcia and Cartagena to assist the governor of Almería, García de Villarroel, against the insurgent threat. However, the marquis' campaign was hindered by desertions and violent looting committed by his insubordinate troops, to the point of suffering a personal attack when he tried to reestablish discipline. Finally, Governor García de Villarroel was able to see the pressure on his city relieved thanks to the approach of the Murcian army and the sending, in January 1569, of six frigates loaded with men and supplies from Cartagena, which committed so many troops to land and naval relief that it was practically unguarded, requiring Murcia to send 266 men to ensure its own defense.[152]​.

That same month, the episode known as the "Inox business" took place, in which the Almeria militias and the crews of the Cartagena ships captained by Gil de Andrada captured more than 3,000 Moriscos on the rock of Inox who were awaiting transport to Barbary by corsairs, being reduced to slavery; Of them, 333 women and girls were destined as loot to Cartagena. The limited progress obtained by the campaigns of the Marquises of Vélez and Mondéjar aroused the dissatisfaction of Philip II, which motivated the appointment of his half-brother, Juan de Austria, as captain general of Granada.[153]​ Fajardo thus ended, demoted in the chain of command, his last service to the Crown, before dying at nearly 66 years of age in 1574.[105]​ Meanwhile, Granadan emissaries had tried to persuade Uluj Ali to take an active part in the uprising, assuring him that, after the Moorish uprising, those of Aragon and Valencia would follow, and that they would give him the port of Cartagena as the nerve center for an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. The Beylerbey chose, however, to focus his efforts on Hafsi Tunisia, although in January 1569 six Algerian galley slaves landed artillery, ammunition and reinforcements near Almería, in contrast to the inability of the Ottoman navy, which was engaged in the "Turkish-Venetian War (1570-1573)" conquest of Venetian Cyprus. In Spain, Philip II ordered Gil de Andrada to patrol the coast and requested naval support from Genoa, Naples and Sicily, which resulted in the interception of numerous privateer ships, although by the spring of 1570 it was estimated that there were some 4,000 Turkish and Berber volunteers fighting in the Alpujarras. Given the intensification of hostilities, the Cartagena militias were mobilized repeatedly to continue integrating into the forces in charge of quelling the rebellion.[154]​.