From the simplest point of view, explicit in many legislations since the Napoleonic Code, considering heritage either as the inheritance of an individual or as his property, heritage only encompasses elements capable of being evaluated monetarily or of pecuniary appreciation. Thus, there are extra-patrimonial rights, such as the right to life, liberty, voting, etc., which, despite being exercised individually, are not individual property as such, which is why the subject cannot dispose of them as he can with the assets of his patrimony.

It is from this conception that in some countries the so-called wealth tax is applied. From this point of view, equity is made up of an asset and a liability:

Obligations, debts and charges "Charge (Right)") in general fall on the patrimonial liabilities. This liability is supported by the assets that form part of the equity. Thus, for example, in a succession mortis causa, the heirs receive an estate, which if it includes unsatisfied and enforceable debts, they must satisfy them.

La mayoría de los autores trazan el origen de la teoría del patrimonio a la obra de Aubry y Rau de 1873.[8]​ Ellos definen patrimonio como “el conjunto de relaciones jurídicas valorables en dinero, que son los activos o pasivos de una misma persona, y que se considera una universalidad jurídica” (“l’ensemble des rapports de droit appréciables en argent, qui ont pour sujet actif ou passif une même personne et qui sont envisagé comme formant une universalité juridique”).

Lo anterior implica varias cosas:[9]​ Cada persona tiene un patrimonio (es, por decirlo así, una característica o atributo universal de las personas) y ese patrimonio es individual, único, indivisible. Sigue que el patrimonio como tal es diferente a lo que lo constituye (el patrimonio es como una bolsa, cuyo contenido son derechos de propiedad, etc.). Sigue también que no todos los derechos o bienes de una persona son patrimoniales (solo aquellos capaces de ser evaluados monetariamente). Finalmente, la mayoría de las autoridades que adoptan esta posición entienden los derechos desde el punto de vista subjetivo. (ver Derecho subjetivo). Consecuentemente muchos autores se refieren a esta percepción como la concepción subjetiva del patrimonio (a diferencia del patrimonio objetivo).

La teoría del patrimonio considera que el patrimonio es independiente de los bienes que una persona posea. Inclusive, una persona puede no tener ningún bien, y aun así, tiene un patrimonio. Es, en otras palabras, una aptitud para poseer, de tal forma que el patrimonio de una persona también incluye derechos de propiedad futuros.

Los bienes de la persona forman un todo unitario que responde por las obligaciones que esta haya contraído, es decir, cuando una persona se obliga, obliga a la masa de bienes. El mejor ejemplo del resultado práctico de esta definición de patrimonio es el caso de los acreedores quirografarios").[10]​ Desde este punto de vista se considera que el acreedor quirografario tiene un derecho personal sobre el patrimonio del deudor, pero no sobre los bienes. El deudor puede enajenar todos sus bienes y sustituirlos por otros totalmente distintos, y el acreedor no puede hacer nada para evitarlo, pero cualquiera que sean esos bienes, el acreedor continúa manteniendo su derecho. Así, el acreedor quirografario tiene un derecho personal sobre el patrimonio del deudor, pero no puede disponer sobre sus bienes (salvo un acto simulado con la intención por parte del deudor de perjudicarle).

Link to legal personality

Heritage is a consequence of personality. The elements of both assets and liabilities are subject to the provisions of a single will: those of the owner. Three principles emerge from this premise:

Derived characters

Since the personality is indivisible and the patrimony is an emanation of it, a person can only have one patrimony.

Under the same previous criteria, the assets cannot be seized. It would be absurd to consider seizing a person's potential to acquire future pecuniary appreciation rights and obligations.

Criticism of heritage theory

Some authors accept the definition of assets as "a set of assets of a person." That is, they define heritage as the grouping of assets and not as a character of the personality of every individual. They further allege that the distinction between assets and heritage is not useful in practice.[11]​.

Among these criticisms, one of the most interesting is the one derived from the work of Henri Capitant")[12]​ and Léon Duguit,[13]​ which can be summarized as follows: if we accept that associations or companies have assets, we have to accept that this assets are different or different from that of the individuals that make up that association or company (in the sense that none of those individuals as such can freely dispose of that social assets and that obligations on it do not fall or bind all of the rights. property of the partners. Conversely, the debts or obligations of individuals do not fall on the assets of the company): that assets belong to the company as a moral or legal individual. But that existence is only a fiction and fictions cannot own anything.[14]​ In reality, that assets belong to the individuals who form that society. "affected"[15]​ to different purposes, societies or companies.[16]​.

The logical development of this idea naturally leads to the complete denial of the legal fiction of the "legal person" and its replacement with the simpler conception that it is not the case - strictly - that the goods or rights of such a legal person "belong to everyone and belong to no one" but rather belong to the end to which they are dedicated (the purpose of the association).[17] For example, it is not the case that a "legal person" has the right to freely dispose of goods or rights that have been assigned to it assigned, but that assets are dedicated to a specific purpose: those assets or rights are dedicated (affected) to that purpose. In other words, it can be argued that what has a right to legal protection is that particular end or purpose. Alois von Brinz") specifically substitutes the thesis of the legal entity and replaces it with a perception of heritage called in French "patrimoine d'affectation"; generally translated into Spanish as patrimony of affection or, sometimes, as "fiduciary patrimony"[18]​ or also "patrimonio fin"[19]​ or even as patrimony objective.[20]​ In contrast to these theories, Brinz ("theory of the patrimony fin") understands that the rights of legal entities, strictly speaking, do not belong “to anyone” but rather belong only with a final purpose.

It is from the aforementioned observations that some authors, mainly Alois von Brinz")[21]​ and Ernst I. Bekker")[22]​ developed the so-called theory of objective heritage"): “The German authors observed that the common criterion that made “universalities” considered was a common purpose, and for this reason they qualified them as “affected heritage” (Zwechvermogen)), objective heritages, without connection with any person. Taking into consideration the conception Rudolf von Ihering's philosophy that the right is a legally protected interest, it is possible to admit that the legal system can aim to protect, in addition to people, certain purposes or objectives, and therefore it is not difficult to accept that, around these purposes, they can also be grouped, they understand rights from the objective point of view (see Objective law). However, there are nuances between the different authorities about the implications of the theory.[23]

It has been argued that Brinz's suggestion enables or justifies limited liability companies.[24] It is necessary, however, to consider that Brinz—as a pandectist—based his observations on a case of Roman law: that of foundations "Foundation (law)") or non-profit or non-profit companies. Notwithstanding that such suggestions establish the principle of legal recognition of social capital companies in a strictly commercial sense, the conception is capable of broader interpretations,[25]​ which has established the legal basis for the existence of "altruistic companies", those whose objective is not to obtain profit for themselves but for others (the beneficiaries being either those who the partners designate or the partners themselves (see, for example: mutualism (movement) "Mutualism (movement)")). This has in turn caused some to equate such societies with the Anglo-Saxon conception of the Trust,[26]​ but not all authorities agree that such equivalence is correct.[27]​.

From the simplest point of view, explicit in many legislations since the Napoleonic Code, considering heritage either as the inheritance of an individual or as his property, heritage only encompasses elements capable of being evaluated monetarily or of pecuniary appreciation. Thus, there are extra-patrimonial rights, such as the right to life, liberty, voting, etc., which, despite being exercised individually, are not individual property as such, which is why the subject cannot dispose of them as he can with the assets of his patrimony.

It is from this conception that in some countries the so-called wealth tax is applied. From this point of view, equity is made up of an asset and a liability:

Obligations, debts and charges "Charge (Right)") in general fall on the patrimonial liabilities. This liability is supported by the assets that form part of the equity. Thus, for example, in a succession mortis causa, the heirs receive an estate, which if it includes unsatisfied and enforceable debts, they must satisfy them.

La mayoría de los autores trazan el origen de la teoría del patrimonio a la obra de Aubry y Rau de 1873.[8]​ Ellos definen patrimonio como “el conjunto de relaciones jurídicas valorables en dinero, que son los activos o pasivos de una misma persona, y que se considera una universalidad jurídica” (“l’ensemble des rapports de droit appréciables en argent, qui ont pour sujet actif ou passif une même personne et qui sont envisagé comme formant une universalité juridique”).

Lo anterior implica varias cosas:[9]​ Cada persona tiene un patrimonio (es, por decirlo así, una característica o atributo universal de las personas) y ese patrimonio es individual, único, indivisible. Sigue que el patrimonio como tal es diferente a lo que lo constituye (el patrimonio es como una bolsa, cuyo contenido son derechos de propiedad, etc.). Sigue también que no todos los derechos o bienes de una persona son patrimoniales (solo aquellos capaces de ser evaluados monetariamente). Finalmente, la mayoría de las autoridades que adoptan esta posición entienden los derechos desde el punto de vista subjetivo. (ver Derecho subjetivo). Consecuentemente muchos autores se refieren a esta percepción como la concepción subjetiva del patrimonio (a diferencia del patrimonio objetivo).

La teoría del patrimonio considera que el patrimonio es independiente de los bienes que una persona posea. Inclusive, una persona puede no tener ningún bien, y aun así, tiene un patrimonio. Es, en otras palabras, una aptitud para poseer, de tal forma que el patrimonio de una persona también incluye derechos de propiedad futuros.

Los bienes de la persona forman un todo unitario que responde por las obligaciones que esta haya contraído, es decir, cuando una persona se obliga, obliga a la masa de bienes. El mejor ejemplo del resultado práctico de esta definición de patrimonio es el caso de los acreedores quirografarios").[10]​ Desde este punto de vista se considera que el acreedor quirografario tiene un derecho personal sobre el patrimonio del deudor, pero no sobre los bienes. El deudor puede enajenar todos sus bienes y sustituirlos por otros totalmente distintos, y el acreedor no puede hacer nada para evitarlo, pero cualquiera que sean esos bienes, el acreedor continúa manteniendo su derecho. Así, el acreedor quirografario tiene un derecho personal sobre el patrimonio del deudor, pero no puede disponer sobre sus bienes (salvo un acto simulado con la intención por parte del deudor de perjudicarle).

Link to legal personality

Heritage is a consequence of personality. The elements of both assets and liabilities are subject to the provisions of a single will: those of the owner. Three principles emerge from this premise:

Derived characters

Since the personality is indivisible and the patrimony is an emanation of it, a person can only have one patrimony.

Under the same previous criteria, the assets cannot be seized. It would be absurd to consider seizing a person's potential to acquire future pecuniary appreciation rights and obligations.

Criticism of heritage theory

Some authors accept the definition of assets as "a set of assets of a person." That is, they define heritage as the grouping of assets and not as a character of the personality of every individual. They further allege that the distinction between assets and heritage is not useful in practice.[11]​.

Among these criticisms, one of the most interesting is the one derived from the work of Henri Capitant")[12]​ and Léon Duguit,[13]​ which can be summarized as follows: if we accept that associations or companies have assets, we have to accept that this assets are different or different from that of the individuals that make up that association or company (in the sense that none of those individuals as such can freely dispose of that social assets and that obligations on it do not fall or bind all of the rights. property of the partners. Conversely, the debts or obligations of individuals do not fall on the assets of the company): that assets belong to the company as a moral or legal individual. But that existence is only a fiction and fictions cannot own anything.[14]​ In reality, that assets belong to the individuals who form that society. "affected"[15]​ to different purposes, societies or companies.[16]​.

The logical development of this idea naturally leads to the complete denial of the legal fiction of the "legal person" and its replacement with the simpler conception that it is not the case - strictly - that the goods or rights of such a legal person "belong to everyone and belong to no one" but rather belong to the end to which they are dedicated (the purpose of the association).[17] For example, it is not the case that a "legal person" has the right to freely dispose of goods or rights that have been assigned to it assigned, but that assets are dedicated to a specific purpose: those assets or rights are dedicated (affected) to that purpose. In other words, it can be argued that what has a right to legal protection is that particular end or purpose. Alois von Brinz") specifically substitutes the thesis of the legal entity and replaces it with a perception of heritage called in French "patrimoine d'affectation"; generally translated into Spanish as patrimony of affection or, sometimes, as "fiduciary patrimony"[18]​ or also "patrimonio fin"[19]​ or even as patrimony objective.[20]​ In contrast to these theories, Brinz ("theory of the patrimony fin") understands that the rights of legal entities, strictly speaking, do not belong “to anyone” but rather belong only with a final purpose.

It is from the aforementioned observations that some authors, mainly Alois von Brinz")[21]​ and Ernst I. Bekker")[22]​ developed the so-called theory of objective heritage"): “The German authors observed that the common criterion that made “universalities” considered was a common purpose, and for this reason they qualified them as “affected heritage” (Zwechvermogen)), objective heritages, without connection with any person. Taking into consideration the conception Rudolf von Ihering's philosophy that the right is a legally protected interest, it is possible to admit that the legal system can aim to protect, in addition to people, certain purposes or objectives, and therefore it is not difficult to accept that, around these purposes, they can also be grouped, they understand rights from the objective point of view (see Objective law). However, there are nuances between the different authorities about the implications of the theory.[23]

It has been argued that Brinz's suggestion enables or justifies limited liability companies.[24] It is necessary, however, to consider that Brinz—as a pandectist—based his observations on a case of Roman law: that of foundations "Foundation (law)") or non-profit or non-profit companies. Notwithstanding that such suggestions establish the principle of legal recognition of social capital companies in a strictly commercial sense, the conception is capable of broader interpretations,[25]​ which has established the legal basis for the existence of "altruistic companies", those whose objective is not to obtain profit for themselves but for others (the beneficiaries being either those who the partners designate or the partners themselves (see, for example: mutualism (movement) "Mutualism (movement)")). This has in turn caused some to equate such societies with the Anglo-Saxon conception of the Trust,[26]​ but not all authorities agree that such equivalence is correct.[27]​.