Concerns
Desde la primera discusión de REDD+ en 2005 y particularmente en la COP-13 de 2007 y la COP-15 de 2009, numerosas voces han expresado sus preocupaciones sobre varios aspectos de REDD+. La COP ha respondido estableciendo las salvaguardas, aunque estas han sido ampliamente criticadas por demasiado genéricas, poco exigibles y escasas más que un conjunto específico de requisitos para la participación en el mecanismo REDD+.
Antes de la aplicación plena deben afrontarse muchos retos. ¿Cómo enlazará el mecanismo REDD+ con las estrategias de desarrollo nacionales existentes? ¿Cómo participarán los habitantes de áreas boscosas y los pueblos indígenas en el diseño, aplicación, seguimiento y evaluación de los programas REDD+ nacionales? ¿Cómo se financiará REDD+ y como asegurarán los países que los beneficios se distribuyen equitativamente entre todos los que gestionan los bosques? ¿Cómo afectará la distribución de fondos en términos de equidad distributiva a los diferentes países?[38] Finalmente ¿cómo se efectuará el seguimiento de las reducciones de emisiones y aumentos de absorción resultantes de actividades REDD+?
Natural forests versus high-density plantations
Safeguard (e) “That actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biodiversity, ensuring that actions are not used for the conversion of natural forests, but rather to encourage their protection and conservation, and that of their ecosystem, and to promote other social and environmental benefits” has a footnote: Taking into account the need for sustainable lives for indigenous peoples and local communities and their interdependence on forests in most countries, reflected in the Declaration of the United Nations on the rights of indigenous peoples as well as International Mother Earth Day.
The UNFCCC does not define what constitutes a forest; it only requires that the parties communicate how they define it. The UNFCCC suggests using a definition in terms of minimum area, minimum crown cover (percentage of land covered by the crowns of living trees) and minimum height at maturity of perennial vegetation.
Although there is a safeguard against the conversion of natural forests, developing country parties are free to include plantations of trees (both native to the country and from other countries) commercially harvestable for their wood (eucalyptus, pine, acacia), for their sap (rubber tree), for their fruits (mango "Mango (fruit"), cocoa tree, citrus), or even non-tree plants such as oil palm, date palm, coconut tree and bamboo. Some REDD+ opponents argue that the lack of a clear distinction is not accidental. Defining a forest simply in terms of tree cover—rather than in terms of biological complexity and the lives of the people who interact with it—has long been used to cover the expansion of industrial-scale plantations. It can be argued that the most likely explanation is that commercial interests take precedence over environmental and social objectives in shaping REDD+ policies.
Similarly, there is no consensus on the definition of forest degradation.[39] The IPCC has made several suggestions, again leaving it up to countries to choose the definition that seems most convenient to them.
A national REDD+ strategy need not only refer to the establishment of national parks or protected areas. By carefully designing standards and guidelines, REDD+ could include land use practices such as crop shifting by indigenous communities and reduced-impact logging, provided sustainable rotation and harvest cycles are demonstrated.[40] Some argue that this opens the door to logging of primary forests, the displacement of local populations, and increased tree plantations.
The achievement of multiple benefits, for example the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services (such as serving as a drainage basin), as well as social benefits (for example, income and improved forest governance) is not currently addressed, beyond their inclusion in the safeguard.
Land ownership, carbon rights and benefit sharing
According to some critics such as Joanna Cabello,[41] REDD+ is another extension of ecocapitalism, which subjects forests and their inhabitants to new forms of expropriation and enclosure at the hands of polluting companies and speculators. So-called "carbon cowboys" – unscrupulous businessmen seeking to acquire rainforest carbon rights – have forced indigenous communities into unfair contracts, often with the intention of making a quick profit by quickly selling these rights to investors. In 2012 it emerged that an Australian businessman had signed 200-year contracts with a Peruvian Amazon tribe, the Yagua, many of whose members are illiterate, giving them a 50% share of his carbon resources. The contracts allowed him to establish and control logging projects and oil palm plantations in the Yagua jungle.[42].
There is a risk that local people and communities living in forests will be bypassed and not consulted, so that they will not receive any income.[43] A fair distribution of REDD+ benefits will not be achieved without prior reform of forest governance and more secure land ownership systems in many countries.[44] How can REDD+ benefits then be distributed to forest communities in a fair and equitable way that minimizes their capture by national governments or forest communities? local elites?[45].
The UNFCCC has made repeated calls for the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and local communities without being more specific. The ability of local communities to effectively contribute to REDD+ activities on the ground and to measure forest properties to estimate emissions reductions and increased uptakes has been clearly demonstrated in several countries.[46].
In project-based REDD+, some cannot be held accountable, and unscrupulous companies are taking advantage of inadequate governance.[47].
indigenous peoples
Safeguard (c): Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws, and taking note that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Safeguard (d): Full and effective participation of all those significantly affected, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities, in [REDD+] actions (...) [and in the development and implementation of national strategies or action plans].
Indigenous peoples are significantly affected by REDD+, as they typically live within forests or base, at least partially, their way of life on exploiting the resources that the forest offers them. The International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) was explicit in the Bali climate negotiations (2007):.
Giving a commercial value to forests disregards the spiritual value they have for indigenous peoples and local communities.[2].
Indigenous peoples protested in 2008 against the final report of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues on climate change and a paragraph supporting REDD+ was captured in a video titled "The 2nd May Uprising".
Groups of Panamanian indigenous people broke off their collaboration with the national UN-REDD program in 2012 after alleging that the Government had not adequately respected their rights.
Some on-the-ground organizations work to develop REDD+ activities with local communities and develop benefit-sharing mechanisms to ensure that REDD+ money reaches both rural communities and governments. Some examples are the Plan Vivo projects in Mexico, Mozambique and Cameroon.[49].
REDD+ in the carbon market
When the UNFCCC first discussed REDD+, it gave no indication of how developing countries would be financially compensated for their efforts to implement it. In the absence of guidance from the COP, two general options were discussed:
Under the market-based approach, REDD+ would act as an “offset system” in which actions with verified results are translated into some form of carbon credits, more or less analogous to the certified emissions reductions (CER) market established by the Kyoto Protocol CDM. These carbon credits could then offset the emissions of the country or company that purchased them. This would require Annex I countries to agree to deeper cuts in their greenhouse gas emissions, thereby creating a market for REDD+ carbon credits. This is unlikely to happen anytime soon given the current state of negotiations at the COP, but there are still fears that the market will be flooded with carbon credits, depressing it to price levels at which REDD+ would no longer be an economically viable option.[50][51] Some developing countries, such as Brazil and China, maintain that developed countries must commit to real emissions reductions, independent of any offsetting mechanism.[52].
Recent studies indicate that a project-based offset approach would significantly increase the transaction costs associated with REDD+ and would actually be the weakest option for a national REDD+ architecture in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, ability to distribute indirect benefits (such as development, biodiversity or human rights) and overall political legitimacy.[53].
Since COP-17, however, it has become clear that the COP is opting for fund-based REDD+ financing, with the new Green Climate Fund as trustee for the disbursement of results-based finance to developing countries that submit verified reports of emissions reductions and increased greenhouse gas removals.[11][12] Now, this money is only available to parts of the UNFCCC that are developing countries, so any REDD+ project in the voluntary carbon market would require other means to market its verified emissions reductions.
Top-down design of large international institutions versus bottom-up design of ground-based coalitions
Although the COP decisions emphasize national ownership and consultation with affected parties, there are concerns that some of the largest institutional organizations are driving the process, particularly outside the one part, one vote framework of multilateral negotiations under the UNFCCC. For example, the World Bank and UN-REDD, the two largest sources of financing and technical assistance for preparedness activities (and therefore unavoidable for most developing countries), establish requirements for recipient countries that can be argued as not mandated or required by COP decisions. A body of research suggests that, at least until 2016, REDD+ as a global architecture has only had a limited effect on local political realities, as the existing dynamics of entrenched powers and incentives for deforestation are not easily changed by the relatively small amounts of money that REDD+ has delivered. Furthermore, REDD+ has not adequately addressed issues such as land ownership, which fundamentally determine who makes decisions about land use and deforestation. And there is no clear consensus on how politically complex issues such as land ownership can be easily resolved to favor, through a top-down mechanism like REDD+, existing forests over logged forests.[54][55][56][57][58].
Although a single harmonized global system that computes and rewards emissions reductions from better forest and land management has not yet been achieved, a number of context-specific projects have emerged that support a variety of activities, including community-based forest management, compliance with target area protection, sustainable charcoal production, and forestry.[59] Although it is not clear whether these various projects are genuinely different from pre-REDD+ integrated conservation and development initiatives, there is evidence that they do not exist. REDD+ has altered global political conversations, possibly causing issues such as indigenous peoples' rights to be raised at a higher level, or vice versa, threatening to bypass safeguards for indigenous peoples' rights. The debate on these issues continues.[60][61][62].
Although the World Bank declares its commitment to the fight against climate change, in the world many civil society organizations and movements attached to the field view with skepticism the processes that are developed around the different carbon funds.[63] Among the most worrying reasons are the weak (or non-existent) consultation processes with local communities, the lack of criteria to determine when a country is prepared to implement REDD+ projects (readiness), negative impacts such as deforestation and loss of biodiversity (due to quick agreements and lack of planning), the lack of safeguards to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and the lack of regional policies to stop deforestation. A growing coalition of civil society organizations, social movements and other actors critical of REDD+ emerged between 2008 and 2011, criticizing the mechanism with arguments of climate justice.[64] During the climate negotiations in Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010) strong coalitions of civil society with social movements formed an energetic front to remove climate powers from the World Bank.[65].