Requirements
One of the most basic assumptions for there to be liability on the part of the Administration is the existence of qualified damage to the property or rights of a natural or legal person. It should be noted that reference is not only made to pecuniary assets, but also to other types of assets, such as moral damages, which in their case will also entail pecuniary compensation.
Among the qualities that the administrative damage must have to comply with this requirement, we must highlight, first of all, the illegality of the Administration's actions. Unlike the liability regime regulated in the Civil Code, where illegality occurs when there is fraud or fault, in the system of strict liability of the Administration, the criterion of illegality focuses on the existence or non-existence of a duty to bear the damage that the laws can attribute to the subjects. If the victim of the administrative damage did not have the duty to bear it, the injury will be unlawful. Otherwise, the responsibility of the Administration will not arise, and it will be the individual himself who will have to bear the damage (this will be the case of taxes, in which the subject suffers property damage, but as a consequence of a law that enables the public power to carry out such injury, and which therefore exempts him from liability.).
The sources also speak of the need for the damage to be effective, thus referring to current and real damages, and ruling out compensation for future or merely possible damages. To the same extent, there is no liability when the damage consists of the simple frustration of expectations, provided that such expectations do not have a highly tangible probability of becoming an increase in goods or rights. Whether frustrated expectations entail compensation will have to be determined case by case by the corresponding court, analyzing the probability index, and taking into account the prevailing criteria at the specific social moment.
On the other hand, the damage must be economically assessable, as stated in article 139.2 LRJAP. This, however, does not mean that only the damage caused to property or property rights is compensated, since in a conventional manner, personal and moral damage can also be evaluated (pretium doloris").
Finally, the damage must be individualizable. This is the most controversial and imprecise point, since it requires that the damage has occurred to a person or group of people, leaving out of administrative responsibility those situations in which a large community, practically impossible to specify, receives the damage. To specify the separation between individualizable and non-individualizable damage, German doctrine uses the concept of "special sacrifice", so that a series of subjects have the right to compensation for having borne an additional burden to the rest of their peers. French doctrine, for its part, resorts to the principle of equality in the face of public burdens, so that only those subjects who have unjustifiably borne an injury caused by the Administration are compensated. The spirit of both doctrines is the same, and the position of the Spanish legal system is based on it.
The damage must have been caused by an official or employee of the Administration, or by one of the bodies of political trust. Furthermore, it must occur as a consequence of an action within the public functions performed by such persons. However, damages caused by contractors and concessionaires of the Administration are excluded, unless the injury was caused by a clause imposed by the Administration, such that the individual was obliged to cause the damage in question. Likewise, exceptions are included in which a professional with public functions responds personally, as may be the case of the notary.
On the other hand, analyzing the formal characteristics of the damage, it should be noted that four types of harmful actions (and omissions) can be found. Thus, the damage may come from the regulatory activity of the Administration, from one of its administrative acts "Administrative Act (Spain)"), from a purely material administrative action or from the inactivity of the Administration.
The Law states that the Administration will be liable for damages caused by its normal or abnormal actions. Two nuances surround this idea. First of all, when we talk about liability for abnormal behavior, we are referring to a technically incorrect activity. The exact point of technical correctness of the administrative action is marked mainly by time and society, so that the courts will pay attention to the common standards that prevail at the specific time and place where the public action occurs.
On the other hand, the legal provision that states that the Administration will be liable for damages caused in its "normal" actions is striking. Strictly speaking, this means that the public entity can cause compensable damages in its normal and correct actions. The matter raises an essential peculiarity, which revolves around the theory of risk. And although the public Administration does not respond when the damage is caused by force majeure, it will do so in cases in which it assumes a certain risk, so that it must compensate when the damage is a consequence of a fortuitous event. This, however, does not include cases in which the benefit of the risk and its own assumption are shifted to the individual. Thus, in the case of a patient who informedly consents to undergo an experimental treatment, he or she will be the one who assumes the benefits. of the treatment, and equally, whoever is responsible for its risks, exempting the Administration from liability. To the same extent, the intentional and illegal action of the individual that entails a certain risk will make the Administration not responsible for the damages that he or she may suffer. Such is the case of the protester in an illegal gathering who suffers damage due to the actions of the riot police.
The cause-effect relationship seems an obvious and simple requirement within the framework of the responsibility required of the Public Administration for damages and losses in its actions. However, the causes of damage are not usually unique, nor do they present a clear relationship. Throughout history, three different theories have been applied, essentially focused on resolving cases in which there is a concurrence of causes, which, by the way, are the most common assumptions.
At first, the theory of exclusive causation predominated, which only held the Administration responsible when its actions had been the sole and exclusive cause of the injury produced. Obviously, the cases in which the Administration is the exclusive cause of the damage are very limited, and the theory represented an extremely advantageous situation for the public entity, since it rarely had to compensate.
At later times, the theory of equivalence of conditions would be applied, which stated that all the factors that caused the injury were equally relevant, taking into account that the absence of any of them would have meant the non-existence of such an injury. It concluded that the total compensation could be demanded from any of the causal sources that caused the damage, with the defendant having to repeat against the rest of the causes. With this, a kind of tacit "solidarity" was established in which the interest of the damaged subject took precedence, despite the arbitrariness of the system.
Finally, we would arrive at the theory of adequate causation, in which the corresponding court selects from among the causes the one that is suitable to cause the injury, and decisive for it to occur. Absolute priority continues to be given to the repair of the damage, although on this occasion, the cause of the damage, who pays the total compensation and who must repeat against the remaining causes, is not selected arbitrarily, but based on the degree to which his actions intervened in the production of the injury.
Among the cases in which a concurrence of causes occurs, three types should be highlighted. Firstly, when the victim has contributed to the cause of the damage, the Administration's compensation is reduced in equal proportion to the degree of intervention of the injured party. If there is intentionality or serious negligence in the victim's actions, the Administration does not have to compensate. Furthermore, full compensation is allowed for cases in which the administrative action was notoriously disproportionate (demonstration in which riot police opened fire with lethal ammunition).
The second case of concurrence of causes is that in which the actions of a third party, unrelated to the victim and the Administration, concur in the cause of the damage. Normally, in these cases, the Administration is required to fully compensate the injured party, even more so when the third party responsible cannot be identified.
The third and last possibility is one in which several public Administrations participate in the cause of the damage. When the damage has occurred within the framework of a joint action between Administrations, first of all the regime that may be provided for in the instrument that regulates such joint action will be taken into account, and failing that, the principle of solidarity will govern, so that the Administration against which the victim wishes to act will be the one that compensates, repeating against the rest of the Administrations that have contributed to causing the damage. If it is not a joint action, the responsibility will be determined for each Administration independently, and when such determination is not possible, joint and several liability will govern.